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Although patients have the legal right in Canada and many other countries to specify how, when 
and by whom their medical records can be accessed, the harsh reality is that in almost all cases 
using existing systems and solutions, patients are unable to ensure that their expressed consent 
directives are respected. Almost all health information systems deployed today lack the most basic 
ability to express and enforce consent at a data field level, and all are stretched when consent 
management must span disparate systems.  Even the simplest of consent directives (e.g. “Only Dr. 
Bob is allowed to read records related to my mental health history status entered in 2017 at the 
Waterloo General Hospital”) is impossible to implement or enforce in an automated fashion. 
 
This is not an unrecognized problem in the consent management domain. Numerous 
consent model types have been proposed, along with a multitude of access control mechanisms.  
Unfortunately, most contemporary consent models used today are either paper based, an online 
consent directive with a digital signature, a simple checkbox to either opt in or opt out or employ 
simple browser cookies.  The result is that most consent models can capture only the most basic 
of consent expressions.  Despite there being many different approaches for expressing and 
managing consent, few models actually enable patients to express discrete consent directives at 
the resource or at the data attribute level. As a result, contemporary consent models are mainly 
used to meet the compliance obligations of healthcare organizations as opposed to empowering 
patients to manage their privacy and control access to their medical records.  No architecture or 
system that we are aware of can adjudicate field-level consent directives in the multi-system, multi-
jurisdiction, multi-provider, multi-patient environments that exist in healthcare today. The 
inability to effectively and efficiently capture and enforce patient consent directives leaves many 
data custodians vulnerable to inadvertent data release – mitigated only by the fact that many 
providers attempt to secure a carte-blanche consent directive from all patients to relieve themselves 
of the problem of needing to respect more restrictive consent directives.  
 
Advances in healthcare IT systems are adding to, rather than reducing, the complexity of 
protecting patient privacy which exposes an important research question: How can we empower 
patients to have control over their health records and be able to dictate who has access to their 
records, where and when? This thesis addresses this question by proposing a consent-centric 
architecture called consent-centric attribute-based access control (C-ABAC). C-ABAC offers a 
new standard for authorization.  It allows expression of consent at any abstraction level – from the 
record to the data field level – and also guarantees that patient consent directives can be enforced 
at the system level, ensuring that patient data is made available only to parties entitled to access it. 
 
The C-ABAC model offers (1) a new standard for “authorization,” (2) a new profile and 
application of attribute-based access control, (3) support for fine-grained access control, (4) 
seamless interoperability, (5) automation of a complex process and (6) dynamic flexibility 
allowing for both rich consent expression and complex consent enforcement.  
 
The following are the steps we followed to test the validity of the C-ABAC model to make 
sure that it achieves the intended goal of empowering patients to express consent and enabling 
organizations to enforce consent directives at a fine-grained level: 
 v 
• Documented a formal model of consent. This formalization provides a way to evaluate a 
set of access policies against a set of attributes that make up the patient consent directive. 
• Came up with a design that follows the model of “convention over configuration”, which 
means that the new standard for authorization takes up the majority of working privacy and 
security use cases into consideration. The model was designed using a microservice 
architecture. 
• Created a prototype using Java and the SpringBoot framework. 
• Exposed all the six microservices through RESTful APIs. 
• Deployed the C-ABAC solution to the IBM Cloud. 
• Used Postman as a testing tool to test the functionality of the C-ABAC model. 
• Used JMeter to test performance. 
• Created a set of test cases that are privacy and security centric. 
• Evaluated access requests against the properties of the formal model of consent. 
• Tested the C-ABAC model against a publicly available data set from the Toronto 
University Health Network. 
• Documented the result. 
• Compared the C-ABAC model against existing consent model types using a set of privacy 
requirements described  
 
Compared to existing consent models that make it difficult for patients to express consent 
directives and make it much more complex, if not impossible, for organizations to enforce these 
consent directives, the C-ABAC model is presented as an alternative to solve some of the problems 
with the existing consent model types. The C-ABAC is a consent-centric, patient-centric, fine-
grained, healthcare-centric and based on an existing healthcare data standard: Fast Healthcare 
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A health information exchange (HIE), Figure 1.1, is a system that enables the electronic movement 
of health-related information among health care organizations (HCOs).  Numerous studies have 
demonstrated that timely access to health information through HIEs improves healthcare efficiency 
[1, 2 , 3], reduces medical errors [4, 5], decreases cost [6, 7] and increases patient satisfaction [8, 
9, 10]. 
 
Figure 1.1: Health Information Exchange Data Providers and Data Consumers 
 
A number of data standards have been developed to facilitate the sharing of health-related 
data within HIEs.  These include the Clinical Document Architecture (CDA) [11], Health Level 
Seven Version 2 (HL7v2) [12], Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine (DICOM) [13], 
and the Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) [14]. FHIR, Figure 1.2, is the most 
recent in the line of standards for healthcare resources [15]. Each of these standards was developed 
to facilitate the sharing of health data such as clinical summaries, imaging studies, prescriptions 
and immunization records with external service providers such as physicians, insurance 
companies, public health professionals and researchers. 
 
Figure 1.2: Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources 
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Despite the significant attention that has been given to achieving the end goal of efficient 
HIEs by finding effective ways through data standards to classify data types, match disparate but 
related records, and address challenges created by linking different proprietary health systems, an 
undesirable byproduct of these advances is that they all add significant complexity to managing 
and protecting patient privacy. It is currently technically challenging, if not impossible, for patients 
to express discrete privacy restrictions (e.g. only Dr. Bob is allowed to view my HIV status at the 
Waterloo General Hospital) or for modern HIEs to enforce any privacy restrictions that a patient 
has expressed.     
  
This situation exists against a backdrop where patients are legally entitled to seek redress 
if their privacy wishes are not respected by a data custodian.  In other words, the law grants privacy 
expectations and rights to patients that current scientific methods are unable to respect. For 
example, under the Canadian Personal Health Information Protection Act [16], the European 
Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [17] and the US Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [18], data custodians need to obtain an individual's consent to 
collect, use and disclose personal health information.  Failure to comply with the consent directives 
given by patients often leads to huge fines [19, 20, 21] and always causes reputational damages 
for data custodians.  Indiana IAM healthcare paid a settlement of $1.25 million for not respecting 
one patient’s consent directive by inadvertently disclosing a patient’s HIV diagnosis on a claim 
page in contravention of the patient’s expressed consent [22]. To be clear, all contemporary 
systems include the functionality to capture consent.  That consent, however, is often high-level 
(“I allow any person who needs access to my records for the purpose of treatment to be granted 
that access” or “I deny access to everyone”). What is currently lacking is the ability to efficiently 
and effectively capture and enforce consent directives at a discrete level. For example, it would 
currently be impossible to implement a consent directive such as, “Dr. Bob can have access to all 
of my medical data except my HIV status” or “Dr. Alice can view my HIV status only when she 
is physically at the Waterloo General Hospital.” Current system design implementations result in 
largely “all or nothing” access.  
 
As the number of HIE participants increases, the complexity of managing privacy will only 
accelerate.  In Canada alone, more than 50 percent of healthcare professionals are accessing 
electronic medical records (a core component that enables HIE) to get laboratory tests, diagnostic 
imaging, clinical reporting, and prescription information [23, 24]. As of March 2017, electronic 
health records of 94 percent of Canadians are available to authorized health care providers through 
the use of HIE systems [25].  Even though 75 percent of Canadians are comfortable sharing their 
health information with healthcare organizations, 80 percent of Canadians are not comfortable 
sharing the same health information with pharmaceutical and insurance companies [26]. As people 
become more aware that their medical information is shared electronically and that they have the 
legal right to express consent as to the scope and nature of that sharing, they face the challenge of 
not having access to well-designed systems that facilitate both the sharing of their sensitive data 
and the control of access to that data. 
 
With the rapid emergence of electronic medical records (EMRs), HIEs, medical devices, 
personal health records (PHRs), mobile healthcare applications and personal health devices, data 
is coming in faster and in larger volumes. It is estimated that worldwide healthcare data volume is 
currently equal to 500 petabytes, and it is expected to reach 25 exabytes in 2020 [27].  With 94 
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percent of Canadian personal health records stored in EMRs, millions of patient-caregiver 
encounters per year, many petabytes of health-related data accessed and more than 3,000 data 
fields in the Discharge Abstract Database alone [28], patients have the right (legally) to express 
restrictive consent for any EMR data field.  The information systems currently used have 
absolutely no way to respect (or even capture) those consent restrictions, as the use of informed 
consent in current mechanisms remains static, paper-based, not consumer friendly, not machine-
readable and not machine-actionable in a manner that recognizes national boundaries and legal 
frameworks [29]. 
 
To preserve privacy, consent management and access control are the primary sources of 
defense.  However, most consent and access control solutions favor companies or providers over 
individual users, as privacy is often considered as an afterthought [30, 31]. Existing consent models 
and access control approaches that are healthcare focused make it difficult for individual patients 
to easily grant or revoke access to their private data or limit the amount of data shared with others 
[32, 33, 34].  
 
There is a need to correct this imbalance by proposing an approach that explicitly embraces 
the patient in the consent granting process and that allows the expression of consent at the field 
level.  As a solution, we created a consent-centric access control model called consent-centric 
attribute-based access control (C-ABAC).  The C-ABAC model is an extension of the attribute-
based access control (ABAC) framework [35]. To demonstrate the viability of C-ABAC, we 
analyzed our proposed approach against a set of key characteristic requirements (Section 1.2) that 
a well-designed consent mechanism needs to meet [36, 34]. 
1.1. Motivation 
 
In an era when information is shared digitally across organizations, it is clear that current privacy 
models do not serve individual patients particularly well. As stated in the MEF Global Consumer 
Trust Initiative privacy document, page 11, “there is no universal template for ‘good’ consent 
models,” and companies use the default “implied consent” in which patients grant consent with a 
single tick box on a very large list of “terms and conditions” [30]. Current mechanisms of informed 
consent remain static and paper-based [29].  There is a pressing need to automate the process of 
collecting consent directives and helping patients to express fine-grained consent at the level of 
individual data fields. 
 
Privacy preservation in HIEs is becoming more complex due to the large number of users 
who are able to access patient records with a click of a button.  HIEs meet the needs of different 
stakeholders with sometimes conflicting viewpoints: patients, health care professionals, 
researchers, insurance companies and public organizations. 
 
Every HIE stakeholder can make arguments for why they should be granted access to 
patient medical records. For example, doctors, nurses and the hospital care team argue that they 
should have access to a person’s medical records to provide the best possible treatment [1, 2]. 
Insurance agencies argue that they must access the patient records to process claims and pay for 
care while protecting against fraud by providers, patients or their families [37].  Researchers argue 
that they need to access patients’ records to improve the quality of care by analyzing data and 
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conducting studies to produce new treatments [38], and increasingly, families and patients 
themselves are demanding access to their medical records [39, 40]. 
 
Arguments for and against access by a given stakeholder to patient medical records often 
lead to confusion over who has the right to view a patient’s medical records based on the consent 
granted by the patient at the time of data collection (assuming explicit consent was even obtained). 
What is missing from most of these arguments is the patient’s will in granting access to and 
protecting his or her medical records.  As in any other domain, such as social networking or 
ecommerce, there is a need in healthcare to empower patients so that they are able to manage their 
privacy and protect their health data [41].  Regrettably, many patients may not be aware of the 
danger of sharing large amounts of data until it is too late. For example, sharing sensitive data such 
as disease status (cancer, HIV and cardiovascular problems) or behavioral health records may lead 
to harm in terms of denied employment, denied insurance claims or discrimination [42]. 
  
To enable patients to manage their own privacy, and to enable system providers to respect 
the privacy directives of patients while still allowing data sharing, we designed a consent-centric 
access control approach that uses a centralized consent directive from the patient at its core to 
control access to data.  
1.2. Key Characteristic Requirements for Consent 
 
Consent (a synonym for authorization) is the process of capturing fully considered and empowered 
permission or a harmonious approval (agreement) or passive assent [34]. The privacy by design 
framework developed by Cavoukian [43] goes further by defining privacy principles that 
encourage moving beyond privacy compliance – for example, by taking a proactive not reactive 
stance and preventive not remedial approaches – by embedding privacy into design.  In practice, 
however, privacy is often considered as an afterthought, as current consent mechanisms tend 
toward the reactive mode end of the continuum [44, 45]. 
 
To recommend a design for a consent-centric access control model, it is useful to define a 
set of key characteristic requirements that the new model needs to meet. These requirements have 
been defined by Maler [34], Xiang et al. [46] and Moehrke et al. [36]: 
 
• Choice: Authorization should be policy-driven, minimizing the use of implied consent and 
maximizing the use of informed and explicit consent.  For a consent to be valid, it must be 
freely given, specific, informed and revocable [58, 59, 47].  Consent should be a patient-
driven initiative, and this includes the right to share data with others and to share specific 
clinical resources while restricting access to other resources. Patients should also have the 
right to revoke access at any time and the right to be forgotten. 
• Consumer-friendly mechanism: Patients should be able to give consent in a manner that 
is well understood and convenient to them.  Patients should be able to view all their consent 
privacy settings in one place. 
• Interoperable:  Consent should be electronically ported or transferred between 
organizations and across jurisdictions.  This requires the use of a widely used data standard 
such as FHIR [48]. 
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• Automation: Consent should be machine-readable and machine actionable. Human 
intervention should not be required to process consent or to allow systems to 
operationalize, access, use and disclose controls.  Rationale: Automation improves the 
speed of handling, accuracy of fulfillment, and auditability.  Paper-based consent should 
be eliminated or kept to a minimum.  This requires the use of a data format that can be 
automatically read and processed by a computer, such as comma-separated values (CSV), 
JavaScript object notation (JSON) or extensible markup language (XML) [49]. 
• Granular: Consent parameters should move from general (overall opt-in/opt-out) to 
granular (specific data attributes, specific people, specific consuming applications). 
• Codifiable: A consent-centric model should use standard codes to express consent 
directives.  This requires the application of security controls at the resource level and at the 
field level. 
• Flexible/adaptable: Features should be “turned-on” or “turned-off” based on differing 
levels of jurisdictional requirements. 
• Unambiguous/complete: Conflicts between directives can be identified and resolved. 
• Dynamic: As opposed to static entitlements defined by administrators at the system level, 
dynamic authorization offers better security controls, as it relies on centrally managed 
policies that are always up to date.  Dynamic authorization management always makes 
authorization decisions in the context of the user, the environment and the resource being 
requested [50]. 
• Separation of concerns: Each component “should do one thing and do it well” [51].  User 
expressed consent directives should be separated from access control policies. Consent 
directives should be expressed by the patient in a text format. Consent directives should 
then be converted into a set of access control policies that can be enforced by an 
authorization framework. 
1.3. Analysis of Typical Consent Types and Access Control 
Approaches in Use 
 
With the key characteristic requirements defined, we briefly analyze typical consent mechanisms 
used and the access control approaches used to enforce these consent mechanisms. Detailed 
analysis is done as part of the literature review section (Chapter 2). 
 
 Consent models are classified into three types from strongest to weakest: opt-in, opt-out 
and no-consent [36, 34].  In an opt-in model, patient consent is required for a patient’s health 
records to be stored, accessed and disclosed within an HIE. In an opt-out model, there is no 
granularity of patient preferences, and this means that the patient can opt out from allowing his or 
her data to be part of an HIE. In a no-consent model, patients have no opportunity to consent to 
their health records being part of an HIE. A no-consent model often covers cases where collecting 
consent is impractical, such as when an individual is unconscious and medical personnel need to 
access the patient’s medical records, or when the law grants access to records regardless of a 




Information systems typically use one of the five common approaches to implementing 
consent models [34]. These are terms and conditions (TaC) opt-in/opt-out, cookie opt-in/opt-out, 
OAuth-based, share and consent directive. 
 
As part of her research when introducing the User-Managed Access (UMA) [34], Maler 
evaluated the five common approaches to implementing consent against a set of optimistic 
requirements that include choice, relevance, granularity, scalability, automation and reciprocity.  
Maler concluded that existing consent models do not meet all the optimistic requirements that a 
well-designed privacy preservation framework should have.  Maler graded the five consent models 
as strong (+1), neutral (0), or weak (-1) for each optimistic requirement, as detailed in Table 1.1. 
 
Requirements Existing Consent Mechanisms 
TaC opt-in Cookie 
opt-in/out 
OAuth Share Consent 
directive 
UMA 
Choice -1 0 0 +1 +1 0/+1 
Consumer-friendly 
mechanism (Relevance) 
-1 0 +1 +1 0 +1 
Interoperable (Scalable) -1 0 0/+1 +1 0 0/+1 
Automation -1 0 +1 +1 -1 0/+1 
Granular -1 0 0/+1 -1 0 +1 
Codifiable -1 0 +1 +1 -1 -1 
Flexible/Acceptable -1 -1 -1 0 -1 +1 
Unambiguous/Complete -1 -1 0 +1 0 +1 
Dynamic -1 -1 0 0 0 0 
Separation of concerns -1 -1 +1 0 0 +1 
 
Table 1.1 Comparing Existing Consent Mechanisms to Optimistic Requirements 
 
Access control for health data has been widely studied [52, 53, 54, 55]. However, few 
researchers have focused on FHIR as the backend standard for medical resources [15], given that 
FHIR is the most recent in the line of standards for healthcare resources [15].  Even though FHIR 
is still in its infancy, its adoption is on the rise. Canada Health Infoway adopted FHIR as the data 
standard of choice for enabling the exchange of medical health records between health 
organizations, caregivers, and patients [56]. FHIR implementation differs from traditional EMR 
and PHR systems. FHIR is representational state transfer based and has its own data modeling 
standards, called resources.  This implies that an access control system running on the top of FHIR 
must adhere to REST and the FHIR resource standards [15].  The common access control 
approaches used to secure access to FHIR resources are OAuth 2.0 and role-based access control 
(RBAC) [57].  
 
In this thesis, we created a new standard for authorization that solves the problems with the 
existing consent model types and automate the process of converting consent directives into a set 
of access policies that are enforced by the attribute-based access control framework. 
 
 7 
1.4. Introducing C-ABAC 
 
The Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) and the 
Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) aim to protect access to users’ personal 
identifiable information such as their name, birth date, and medical records. Among the central 
principles of the PIPEDA and PHIPA are the individuals’ right to manage and control the 
collection, use, disclosure and retention of their personal information. Patients have the right to 
control access to their data , right to withdraw consent at any time, right to restrict processing, right 
to object, right to retrieve data in a commonly used and machine-readable format and right to 
transmit that data to another controller without hindrance from the controller [58, 59]. Based on 
the analysis from Section 1.3 and Chapter 2.0 of the typical consent types and access control 
approaches in use, it is clear that current privacy models do not meet the key characteristic 
requirements from Section 1.2, do not meet the PHIPA requirements, and do not serve individual 
patients particularly well.  
 
C-ABAC solves two problems: a) it allows patients to express informed consent at any 
abstraction level – from the record through to the data field, and b) it guarantees that patient consent 
directives are enforced at the system level, ensuring that detailed and discrete patient consent 
directives are available to all parties needing access to this information. This is achieved through 
the use of an interoperable and centralized consent management server (Section 1.4.1).  
Enforcement of the consent directives expressed by patients is achieved through the use of the 
ABAC framework (Section 1.4.2).   
1.4.1. Informed Consent Expression 
 
To ensure the effective and efficient capture of informed consent directives, we created an 
interoperable and centralized consent management server that is managed by a trusted third-
party consent directive custodian. The interoperable, centralized consent management acts on 
FHIR resources (e.g. patient demographics, medication, observation, immunization) and subjects 
(e.g. care team, clinician, caregiver, consuming application, researcher etc.).  Subjects and FHIR 
resources should be registered with the trusted third-party consent directive custodian to use the 
system. 
 
The C-ABAC model allows the patient to upload one or many consent directives that can 
be applied to subjects and FHIR resources. Figure 1.3 illustrates the principles and roles of the 
interoperable, centralized consent management server. The patient consent directive is uploaded 
by the patient (data owner) to a centralized server (managed by a trusted data custodian).  All 
systems (hospital system A, labs system, pharmacy system, insurance system etc.) are able to 









Figure 1.3: C-ABAC – An Interoperable, Centralized Consent Server 
 
Figure 1.4 shows the different components that make up the centralized consent 
management server. This includes the consent directive, the security labels and the languages 




Figure 1.4: C-ABAC Model Data Flow 
 
The FHIR specification is an integral part of the C-ABAC model.  We use the FHIR 
specification to create the semantics of the C-ABAC to achieve interoperability.  In addition to the 
FHIR specification, security labels are used to achieve granularity. A security label is metadata 
that can be applied to a subject (e.g. patient or data requestor) and to data objects (e.g. patient 
demographic, encounter, medication, observation or imaging study). Figure 1.5 illustrates an 
example of a security label attached to a medication resource of type “search” informing the data 
requestor to delete all copies of a medication resource after use. 
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Figure 1.5: Security Label Applied to a Medication Resource  
 
To formulate the access control policies, we used ALFA, which translates the consent 
directive into a set of rules that could be evaluated by the policy enforcement point (PEP). ALFA 
is a pseudocode language that maps directly into the XACML [61]. We formulate semantics that 
convert FHIR consent directives and the security labels to ALFA and to XACML (Figure 1.6). 
 
 






















The C-ABAC data flow is outlined in Figure 1.7: 
 
 
Figure 1.7: C-ABAC Data Flow 
 
Ecosystem parties: 
Alice is the patient (patientid123). 
Bob is the doctor (doctor123) and works for Hospital A (hospital123). 
Hospital A is where Alice’s health records are stored. 
Hospital A has a patient’s portal. 
 
Data Flows: 
• Steps 1, 2 and 3: Patient Alice with patientid123 logs in to Hospital A’s patient portal to obtain 
an authorization token. 
• Step 4: Patient Alice manages access to her medical records (e.g. blood-pressure with an 
identity of observation123). 
• Step 5: Patient Alice creates a consent policy with an identity of consent123 (Figure 1.9) to 
share observation123 (Figure 1.8) with Doctor Bob (doctor123) for the purpose of treatment. 
• Remaining steps: Doctor Bob (doctor123) issues a request to access Patient Alice’s observation 
resource (observation123). The assumption is that Doctor Bob is already authorized to request 





Figure 1.8: Observation Resource 
 
Figure 1.9: Consent Directive Resource 
 
1.4.2. Informed Consent Enforcement 
 
We are addressing two research problems as part of this thesis:   
 
a) how to overcome the limitations presented by current technical approaches to 
effectively ensure the accurate and complete capture of informed consent directives 
that meet the key characteristic requirements of a well-designed privacy preservation 
framework (Section 1.2)  and 
 
b) the inability of current technical approaches to enforce consent directives that have 
been captured at the document and field levels to meet the fine-grained key 
characteristic requirement.   
 
Informed consent expression is achieved through the creation of an interoperable and 
centralized consent directive and security control that uses the FHIR specification (Section 1.4.1).  
To realize the informed consent enforcement, we implemented authentication, delegated 
authorization, policy management and policy enforcement. 
 
Based on the outcome of our evaluation from the literature review, Chapter 2, all of the 
commonly used access control frameworks have their own strengths and weaknesses.  To help 
address this challenge, instead of using one access control framework to implement an informed 
consent enforcement, we use three complementary access control frameworks: OpenID Connect 
(OIDC), OAuth 2.0 and ABAC. These three frameworks are complementary standards that can be 
used to offer a comprehensive enforcement mechanism for the C-ABAC model.  
 
For authentication, we use OIDC. OIDC is an interoperable authentication protocol based 
on the OAuth 2.0 specification and uses the standard JSON web token (JWT) [62].  For delegated 
authorization, we use OAuth2.0.  OAuth2.0 addresses the password anti-pattern problem [63] 
and is more suited for authorization delegation [64 ] than it is for policy management and 
enforcement (e.g. instead of sharing my username and password with Dr. Bob to access my 
personal health records, I provide Dr. Bob an OAuth 2.0 authorization token to access these 
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records). For policy management and policy enforcement, we use the ABAC framework.  ABAC 
and its XACML policy language enable dynamic and fine-grained access control and offer greater 
efficiency, flexibility, scalability and security than traditional access control methods [65]. To 
avoid conflict between OAuth2.0 and ABAC, OAuth 2.0 is only used to delegate authorization, 
while ABAC is used for evaluating the policy (permit/deny) of the C-ABAC consent directive. 
Figure 1.10 illustrates the informed consent data flow that combines three complementary 
standards: OpenID Connect, OAuth 2.0 and ABAC.  
 
Figure 1.10: FHIR-ABAC Enforcement Data Flow 
 
1.5. Application of approach 
 
We followed a four-step approach to design, develop, implement and test the C-ABAC model: 
 
Step 1: Designed a consent-centric model that uses the FHIR resources and security 
labels.  The outcome of this step is a centralized consent management service that is 
accessible via RESTful APIs and uses the FHIR specifications to define the consent 
directive and security labels.  
 
• Step 2: Extended the ABAC framework and incorporated the consent expression 
component. As part of this step, we combined a variety of complementary access 
control frameworks – namely, OIDC for authentication, OAuth 2.0 for delegated 
authorization and the ABAC framework for dynamic authorization. To express consent 
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directives, we used JSON and the FHIR specification.  To convert consent directives 
into a set of policies, we used ALFA. 
 
• Step 3: The first two steps mainly focus on architecture and design. In the third step, 
we created the C-ABAC prototype by extending the HAPI-FHIR open source 
framework (http://hapifhir.io/).  We used Java programming and the SpringBoot 
framework to create our prototype [66]. We extended our consent management service 
with the OIDC, OAuth 2.0 and ABAC libraries.  Our consent management service 
combined with the access control libraries form our C-ABAC model.  The C-ABAC 
model is then integrated with the HAPI-FHIR open source framework. 
 
• Step 4: As part of this step, we evaluated the proposed C-ABAC model using a 
qualitative approach and demonstrate that, unlike existing consent and access control 
approaches, our model meets the key characteristic requirements from Section 1.2. We 
also tested the C-ABAC/HAPI prototype against the University Health Network HAPI-
FHIR public server (https://fhirtest.uhn.ca/), which stores, as of May 2019, over 1 
million test patient demographics and medical records, including over 100,000 
observations, over 20,000 medical statements and over 7,000 encounters.  We tested 
whether access is being appropriately denied based on user consent directives, and we 
documented the results of the different test cases. 
1.6. Contributions 
 
There are numerous technical challenges and inefficiencies to implementing an adequate informed 
consent model in healthcare [67, 68] that addresses patient privacy concerns and meets regulatory 
requirements.  It is impossible at the moment for patients to clearly express discrete privacy 
directives at the document and the field level, and it is difficult for existing systems to enforce such 
directives even if they could be expressed. This work seeks to overcome these technical challenges 
by recommending a comprehensive consent-centric model to address two problems: (a) how to 
express and capture consent and (b) how to enforce patient consent directives to meet the key 
characteristic requirements from Section 1.2.  This thesis makes the following key contributions: 
 
• Informed consent expression: We created a novel and a centralized consent-centric model 
that is patient-centric, fine grained, industry specific (healthcare) and interoperable using 
the FHIR standard to overcome the limitations presented by current technical approaches 
to capturing and automatically processing patient informed consent directives. 
 
• Informed consent enforcement: We automatically convert patient consent directives into 
a set of policies that can be enforced by the PDP of the ABAC framework. 
 
In summary, our contributions are a scalable new standard for authorization, a new profile 
and application of ABAC, a fine-grained access control through the use of security labels and an 
interoperable model that can easily be integrated with existing HIEs through a widely used 
healthcare data standard (FHIR). 
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1.7. Thesis Outline 
 
Chapter 2 illustrates the related work and explains the background necessary to understand the 
details of the proposed model. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the details of the proposed model, including architecture, design and the 
interaction between the different components. 
 
Chapter 4 provides examples of how the C-ABAC model can be applied in real-world scenarios 
through use cases. It also tests and validates the C-ABAC model against a publicly available health 
data set from the Ontario University Health Network server [69] and determines whether the 
proposed C-ABAC model adequately addresses the design goals. 
 





2. Related Work 
 
The C-ABAC consent-centric model is related to several areas of the research, including the 
following: 
 
• Consent model types 
• Access control approaches 
• Languages used to enforce policy 
• Healthcare standards 
 
In comparison with related work, this thesis introduces the design of a consent-centric and 
access control model that focuses on expressing and enforcing informed consent. We propose an 
interoperable and centralized informed consent model using the Fast Healthcare Interoperability 
Resources (FHIR) specifications [48].  We enable fined-grained access privacy controls using 
security labels.  The consent-centric enforcement is achieved using three complementary access 
control approaches: OpenID Connect (OIDC), OAuth 2.0 and attribute-based access control 
(ABAC). 
2.1. Consent Model Types 
 
Consent is a set of policies that enable individual users to choose what data they are willing to 
permit their service providers to access and share [70].  In healthcare, consent allows patients to 
affirm their participation in electronic health initiatives, including patient portals, personal health 
records (PHRs), and health information exchanges (HIEs) [71].  The following are the different 
consent types in use today: terms of service (ToS) opt-in/opt-out, cookie opt-in/opt-out, OAuth, 
share and the medical consent directive. 
 
The terms of service (ToS), also referred to as terms and conditions (TaC) and end-user 
license agreement (EULA), are rules to which one must agree to use a service [72]. ToS can also 
be merely a disclaimer, especially regarding the use of websites.  Most users skip reading the ToS 
because of its tiny font size, large document size and the technical language used, which makes it 
difficult to understand.  The user is given two options: “Agree” or “Decline.”  Many web 
applications do not offer a choice to users – either they accept the TaC, or they are not allowed to 
access the service.  The TaC are often too complex to understand, and they do not support different 
levels and choices of access to personal data [72]. For these reasons, the TaC mechanism does not 
meet many of the key characteristic requirements from Section 1.2, including that it be automated, 
have a consumer-friendly mechanism and be scalable. 
 
A cookie is a small file stored on a user’s computer designed to hold a small amount of 
data specific to that user and a website. This allows the provider to deliver a page tailored to a 
particular user by tracking his or her activities and to deliver targeted content such as news, 
products and services [73].  Visitors to websites are given controls over whether cookies are set or 
not, and they can either opt in or opt out.  There are four categories of cookies: strictly necessary, 
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performance, functionality and targeting/advertising [74].  Since the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) came into force in May 2018, websites operating out of Europe have been 
required to get user consent before storing cookies. Cookies are becoming an inconvenient way to 
obtain user consent, as users are regularly interrupted by pop-up windows indicating cookies that 
they must consent to [32].  Similar to ToS, cookie-based consent models do not meet many of the 
key characteristic requirements from Section 1.2 
 
An OAuth-based consent process allows patients to authorize external users and 
applications to access private data such as demographics, imaging studies and observations.  
OAuth 2.0 lacks a language such as the extensible access control markup language (XACML) to 
define policies, which makes it difficult for organizations using it to manage patient’s privacy 
rules. OAuth 2.0 defines permission in terms of scopes.  If a user has many scopes, this may lead 
to scope explosion (also known as token bloat) [75]. The original intent of OAuth 2.0 is to provide 
a framework for delegated consent, which is a form of discretionary authorization but is different 
from policy-driven, dynamic and fine-grained authorization [76]. OAuth 2.0 does not meet many 
of the key characteristic requirements from Section 1.2, including dynamic authorization, choice, 
flexibility and completeness. 
 
The share feature allows a user to share a file with anyone by generating and sharing a link 
to a file or folder stored online with a service provider such as Google Drive or Dropbox [77].  The 
user can also configure privacy settings such as view, comment, edit and download [78].  Anyone 
with the shared link can access the shared files.  Some service providers, such as Google, allow 
users to share files and folder with only specific users by using the recipients email addresses.  The 
Share option is limited in scope in terms of features, as users can apply permissions only at the 
document level and not at the field level (e.g. I can share my Google document, but I am unable 
to limit the sharing to a specific line or section within my Google document), thus the share option 
does not meet the granularity (fine-grained access control at the field level) requirement. 
Additionally, the Share consent model does not meet many of the other key characteristic 
requirements from Section 1.2, including flexibility and separation of concerns. 
 
The medical consent directive, which is usually paper based [29], allows patients to grant 
or deny access to their personal health information (PHI) [79] for the purpose of care, operations 
or payment.  Patients can also grant or withhold consent for the purpose of research, public health, 
quality control measures and marketing.  Most consent directives that are offered at initial point of 
care and enrollment are paper based, and there are no standard paper consent forms within a 
jurisdiction [33].  Medical consent directives do not meet many of the key characteristic 
requirements from Section 1.2, such as the requirement that it be consumer-friendly (e.g. as a 
patient, I need to sign a consent directive every time I visit a hospital) and provide granularity (e.g. 
as a patient, I am not able to limit access to my medical records at the document or the field level). 
 
All these consent model types in use today make it difficult for patients to control who has 
access to their medical records and to limit such access to a specific data set [34].  It is currently 
technically challenging, if not impossible, for patients to express discrete privacy restrictions or 
for modern HIEs to enforce any privacy restrictions that a patient might have expressed.  This 
thesis came up with an approach that explicitly embraces the patient in the consent granting process 
and enabled consent to be expressed at the data field level. 
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2.2. Access Control Approaches 
 
An access control (AC) function is used to limit which principals (persons, processes and 
machines) have access to which resources (files, directories, data stores and records) and what kind 
of actions (write, read, delete, update, execute and share) principals can perform against the 
resources through permissions assignment [80].  There are a variety of access control approaches 
used today to protect healthcare resources that are based on the FHIR – namely OAuth 2.0, role-
based access control (RBAC), ABAC and relationship-based access control (ReBAC) [57, 81, 82]. 
Traditional access control approaches have been successfully applied in different 
environments to solve various problems [83, 84].  To create a comprehensive pre-preservation 
architecture that solves both the expression and enforcement problems for informed consent, we 
combined three complementary frameworks. We used OIDC for authentication, OAuth2.0 for 
delegated authorization and ABAC for policy management and policy enforcement. Clearly, there 
are extensions to AC that have been proposed to solve a similar problem in healthcare [15, 82, 
85,86], but those extensions either focus on consent expression or consent enforcement, but they 
don’t focus on standardization, automation and integration. Because FHIR is the most recent in 
the line of such standards [15], few have focused on FHIR as the backend standard for medical 
resources [15]. 
2.2.1. OAuth 2.0 
 
OAuth 2.0 is an open standard for delegated authorization that gives a process to third-party 
applications to obtain access to a user’s resources on a resource server without the user having to 
share their login credentials [87]. OAuth 2.0 is widely used for delegated authorization by 
companies such as Facebook, Google, Twitter, Microsoft (MSN and Live), Instagram, Foursquare, 





Figure 2.1: OAuth 2.0 Workflow 
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1. The OAuth client application (browser or mobile application) initiates the flow when it 
directs the user agent (browser) of the resource owner to the authorization endpoint.  The 
OAuth client includes its client identifier, requested scope, local state and a redirection 
URI.  The authorization server sends the user agent back to the redirection URI after access 
is granted or denied. 
2. The resource owner provides an authorization token to send to the authorization server. 
3. The authorization server authorizes the resource owner through the user agent and either 
grants or denies the access request.  
4. If the resource owner grants access, the OAuth client uses the redirection URI provided in 
Step 1 to redirect the user back to the OAuth client. The redirection URI includes an 
authorization code. 
5. The user agent sends the authorization code back to the OAuth client. 
6. The OAuth client requests an access token from the authorization server through the token 
endpoint.  The OAuth client authenticates with its client credentials and includes the 
authorization code received in the previous step. For verification, the OAuth client includes 
the redirection URI used to obtain the authorization code. 
7. The authorization server validates the client credentials and the authorization code. The 
server also ensures that the redirection URI received matches the URI used to redirect the 
client. If the URI is valid, the authorization server responds with an access token. 
8. Once the client app obtains an access token, it can use it to access the resource server. 
 
The original intent of OAuth is to provide a framework for delegated consent, which is a 
form of discretionary authorization that differs from policy-driven authentication [91]. OAuth 2.0 
lacks a language such as XACML to define policies. Instead, it defines permission in terms of 
scopes.  If a user has many scopes, this may lead to scope explosion (also known as token bloat) 
[75]. Token bloat occurs when a single user is a member of too many groups on an authorization 
server and has too many scopes. 
 
OAuth 2.0 is not an authentication protocol and does not provide single sign-on [92].  However, 
OAuth protocol has been used within many authentication protocols, such as OIDC [89].   
 
2.2.2. OpenID Connect 
 
OIDC is a lightweight authentication protocol developed under the OpenID Foundation working 
group [93]. OIDC is based on the OAuth 2.0 family of specifications, and it uses a JavaScript 
object notation (JSON) web token [89].  OIDC lets applications and site developers authenticate 
users without their taking on the responsibility of storing and managing passwords [93].  In 
addition to handling authentication, OIDC also obtains basic profile information about the end user 




Figure 2.2: OpenID Connect (OIDC) Workflow 
 
1. The user or resource owner enters his or her OpenID (e.g. example@gmail.com) or picks 
an OpenID provider from the list (e.g. Google). 
2. The user is redirected to the discovered OpenID provider (e.g. http://www.gmail.com). 
3. The user authenticates by entering his or her login credentials and approves (or consents 
to) the attributes requested from the relaying party. 
4. OIDC validates the user’s credentials. 
5. The user is redirected to the relying party. A key known only to the OpenID provider and 
the corresponding relying party is used to sign this response. Once the relying party 
receives the response, it validates the signature. 
6. Once the user access token is validated, the relying party forwards the user to his or her 
services. 
 
The C-ABAC model includes an end-to-end architecture for user consent as part of its 
design. We used OIDC that relies on OAuth 2.0 protocols to authenticate the patient and to create 
and manage his or her informed consent.   
2.2.3. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
 
RBAC, Figure 2.3, is “used to regulate access to systems, resources or information based on the 
roles of individuals within an organization” [94]. RBAC assigns permissions to roles, and users 
are assigned roles.  In RBAC, access control checks that the user has the needed permission by 
checking the role before denying or allowing access to desired resources.  RBAC suffers from the 
same issue as OAuth 2.0: scope explosion. To handle different use cases, administrators create 
many roles over time. Some of these roles may conflict with each other, which leads to a failure 
in the separation of duties. Traditional RBAC is not able to specify authorization policies or 
constraints that are sufficiently fine grained to be applied to an access control policy [95].  RBAC 
does not take into consideration environmental conditions that are outside of the scope of 




Figure 2.3 Overview of the RBAC Model [96] 
2.2.4. Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) 
 
ABAC is a promising alternative to traditional models of access control such as discretionary 
access control (DAC), mandatory access control (MAC) and RBAC.  However, ABAC adoption 
is still in its infancy [35].  ABAC is an approach in which access rights are granted to users (e.g. 
components, persons, devices and processes) via the use of policies that combine attributes [97,98]. 
These policies involve different types of attributes (e.g. component attributes, user attributes and 
resource attributes). Time and space attributes are especially relevant when temporal and 
geospatial access control policies are required [99].  While many research studies have investigated 
the application of ABAC to existing problems and have attempted to formalize ABAC further, few 
have sought to provide an in-depth summary of current efforts or detail the open problems present 
in the area of ABAC research [Error! Bookmark not defined.]. 
 
ABAC would be beneficial in an HIE with many systems and many stakeholders. ABAC 
removes the need for manual intervention when authorizing users for certain roles or security levels 
and thus simplifies administration in complex systems with a large number of users while also 
automating access control decisions for remote users from external systems [Error! Bookmark n
ot defined.].  
 
As part of this thesis, we used ABAC to implement the informed consent enforcement 
mechanism [100, 101, 102]. 
 
2.2.5. Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC) 
 
ReBAC expresses authorization policy in terms of relationship between users (e.g. mother-child, 
friend-friend, doctor-patient of employer-employee), and access control policies are expressed in 





Figure 2.4: ReBAC Model 
 
ReBAC is widely used in online social networks (OSNs) [104].  Traditional access control 
such as DAC, MAC, RBAC and ABAC uses attributes or some type of user credentials such as 
role, age or security label to evaluate access control authorization. ReBAC introduces the concept 
of relationship as another attribute to define access control authorization.  ReBAC has also been 
applied to domains other than OSNs. For example, Rizvi et al. demonstrated that ReBAC can be 
incorporated into a production scale medical records system to control access to patient medical 
records based on relationships (e.g. my primary physician is allowed to access my medical records) 
[82].  ReBAC can be merged into ABAC, as relationship is considered as an attribute within 
ABAC.  Rizvi et al. did not use the FHIR consent directive [105] and did not implement the 
recommended FHIR security labels infrastructure [106] to enable the fine-grained access control 
to resources that would enable patients to limit the amount of health data shared with others. 
 
2.2.6. User Manager Access Control 
 
The User Managed Access (UMA) framework is an OAuth-based protocol that enables users to 
control access to their digital data, content and services [107].  UMA privacy principles and the 
UMA framework are widely accepted and used by the privacy and security community [107, 86, 
85, 108, 109, 89,110, 111]. We built the C-ABAC model on the top of the work that Maler 
proposed.  The design proposal for our C-ABAC model is evaluated against Maler’s optimistic 
requirements and the key characteristic requirements from Section 1.2.   
 
Since the UMA 2.0 profile was built using the OAuth framework [86], it suffers from the 
same limitations as OAuth 2.0. Released in May 2017, HEART is a still new profile, and there is 
little research and documentation on HEART [112]. The focus of UMA and HEART is primarily 
on resource owners trying to protect individual resources.  UMA does not make use of specific 
resource attributes – for example, “Release all patient data to researcher A where patient-age > 






2.2.7. Automated Consent management Solution 
 
Huynh et al. create a multi-layered access control model called SGAC (Solution de Gestion 
Automatisée du Consentement / automated consent management solution) that manages patient 
privacy wishes regarding access control to their medical records. SGAC implemented a conflict 
resolution strategy to resolve conflicts between competing access policies [113]. 
 
Similar to C-ABAC, SGAC empowers patients to control access to their medical records.  
However, SGAC does not meet the following key characteristic requirements from Section 1.2 
that the C-ABAC meets. 
• Interoperability: Interoperability enables health information systems to work together 
across organization boundaries to advance patient care.  The majority of health care IT 
systems uses either HL7, DICOM or FHIR to enable interoperability.  C-ABAC uses FHIR 
as its data model for consent expression to meet the interoperability requirement.  SGAC 
did not implement any of the existing healthcare data standards to enable interoperability.  
SGAC does not meet the ease of integration with EMR and HIE that are FHIR compliant. 
• Fine-grain access control: C-ABAC empowers patients to control access at any abstraction 
level: at the record level and at the attribute level. SGAC implements an access control at 
the record level, but not at the attribute level.  SGAC does not implement the concept of 
security labels to achieve a fine-grain access control at the filed level. 
• Codifiability:  C-ABAC meets the codifiability requirement by implementing and using 
security labels.  EMR and HIE that are FHIR compliant are able to interpret and enforce 
these security labels. SGAC does not implement and use any security labels.  Without, 
security labels, patient and organizations don’t have a common language to restrict access 
to resources and attributes.   
• Separation of concerns: The C-ABAC model follows a microservice architecture and 
meets the “convention over configuration” requirement.  The C-ABAC model outlines 
clearly the different components and the six microservices that make up the model.  The 
C-ABAC model achieves the separation of concerns and the services can scale up and 
down to meet the performance requirements of HIEs.  SGAC used XACML policy 
language to convert patient consent directives into a set of XACML access policies, but 
the authors did not specify in their paper what are the different components and services 
that make up the SGAC model. 
 
2.2.8. Health Information Protection and Associated Technologies 
 
Health Information Protection and Associated Technologies, HIPAAT, is a commercial product 
that enables health information exchanges to capture and enforce patient privacy.  HIPAAT uses 
OAuth 2.0 and thus lacks a language, such as XACML, to define policies.  Also, there is no 
indication that HIPAAT enables s patients to express informed consent at the data field level 
[114]. Compared to HIPAAT, C-ABAC allows patients to express informed consent at any 




2.3. Policy Languages 
 
The XACML is an OASIS standard that describes both a policy language and an access control 
decision request/response language, both written in extensible markup language (XML).  The 
policy is used to describe general access control requirements. The request/response language lets 
systems answer the question of whether an access request should be allowed or not using one of 
four values: permit, deny, indeterminate or not applicable [115].  XACML data flow is defined in 
[116] and illustrated in Figure 2.5: 
 
 
Figure 2.5: XACML Data Flow 
 
The de facto format for XACML is XML.  XML is extremely verbose and difficult to read 
for humans.  The XACML grammar is also a rich grammar.  The combination of these two aspects 
lead to an XML representation of XACML difficult to edit by hand [117].  The abbreviated 
language for authorization (ALFA) is a domain-specific language for a high-level description of 
XACML policies.  ALFA is designed with ease of use in mind [117]. ALFA maps directly into 
the XACML and contains the same structural elements as XACML 3.0 policies [118]. 
 
As part of the C-ABAC solution, we used the ALFA plugin for Eclipse [119] to formulate 
FHIR policies that are automatically translated by ALFA into XACML.  
2.4. Healthcare Standards 
 
To enable the interoperability of healthcare resources between disparate healthcare systems, 
several healthcare data standards have been developed, including the digital imaging and 
communication in medicine (DICOM), clinical document architecture (CDA), heath level seven 
(HL7 v1, v2 and v3) and FHIR standards.   
 
FHIR is the latest standards framework created by the Health Level Seven organization 
that combines the best features of the HL7 version 2 and version 3 and CDA product lines while 
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leveraging the latest web standards and applying a tight focus on interoperability and ease of use 
[120].  There are currently 92 resources available as part of the FHIR standard [121], and they are 
divided into five categories [14]: foundation, base, clinical, financial and specialized.  
 
A resource is a data object that has a known identity (a URL) by which it can be addressed, 
identifies itself as one of the types of resources defined by the specification, contains a set of well-
defined data elements and has an identified version that changes if the contents of the resource 
change [122]. The structure of a resource in FHIR is represented as unified modeling language, 
XML and JSON.  The following optional elements and properties are defined for all resources: 
 
{   
   "resourceType": "name", 
   "id": "id", // Logical identifier of this artifact 
   "meta": "Meta", // Metadata about the resource 
   "implicitRules": "<uri>", //A set of rules under which this content was created 
   "language": "<code>", // Language of the resource content 
} 
 
Figure 2.6 illustrates an example of an FHIR patient resource from the FHIR website [123]: 
 





Existing consent mechanisms in use today do not empower patients to manage the exposure [34] 
of their medical record to caregivers, researchers, insurance companies and other HIE participants.  
The typical consent mechanism used in a hospital setting is either paper-based, an online consent 
directive using a digital signature, a check box to opt-in or opt-out, or browser cookies recording 
an opt-in or opt-out.   
 
Paper-based consent directives are not consumer friendly, not machine readable and not 
machine actionable [29]. Opt-in/opt-out checkboxes in an online interaction using a long TOS 
regulatory document that is hard to read and understand do not allow patients to manage their 
privacy with sufficient granularity, from the record level to the individual field level. Similar to 
opt-in/opt-out checkboxes, cookies are becoming an inconvenient way to get users’ consent, as 
users are regularly interrupted by pop-up windows asking for their consent to [32].   
 
Access controls such as OAuth 2.0, RBAC, ABAC, ReBAC and other extensions – namely, 
SGAC and UMA mainly focus on consent enforcement as opposed to allowing users to express 
their informed consent.  Other than ABAC, traditional access control frameworks do not offer 
flexibility to dynamically manage patient privacy settings at a fine-grained level and do not 
consider environmental conditions in enforcing access controls. Although ABAC is not yet widely 
used to control access to protected resources, it is expected that by 2020, 70 percent of businesses 
will use ABAC to protect their critical assets [124]. Since UMA and SGAC do not meet the key 
characteristic requirements described in chapter 1, t C-ABAC is created as an alternative to these 
two models. The C-ABAC model meets the design goals and the key characteristic requirements 
described in Chapter 1 to allow patients to easily express consent and to allow data custodians to 
enforce it at a fine-grained level. 
 




3. Description of the Approach 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, existing consent models and access control approaches do not meet the 
design goals and the key characteristic requirements described in Chapter 1 to allow patients to 
easily express consent and to allow data custodians to enforce it at a fine-grained level.  To 
overcome this challenge, in this chapter, we design a consent-centric model that allows patients to 
explicitly declare consent directives and allows organizations to enforce those directives.  
 
The consent-centric attribute-based access control (C-ABAC) model is based on the Fast 
Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) microservices representational state transfer 
(REST) specifications [125]. The two components that make up the C-ABAC model (consent 
expression and consent enforcement) use a microservice architecture. In this architecture, an 
application is composed of many discrete, network-connected components, termed microservices 
[126].  REST is used as an HTTP-based communication protocol to allow the C-ABAC services 
to communicate with external applications (e.g. a personal health records application). 
 
The C-ABAC model solves two problems that have limited consent management systems 
to date:  
 
a)  C-ABAC allows patients to express informed consent at any abstraction level, from 
the record down to the data field, and  
 
b)  C-ABAC guarantees that patient consent directives are enforced at the system level, 
ensuring that detailed and discrete patient consent directives are available to all 
parties needing access to this information.   
 
To address these two problems, our consent-centric model is composed of two main 
architecture components: a consent expression component and a consent enforcement component.  
To meet the “separation of concerns” key characteristic requirements from Chapter 1, the two main 
components are subdivided into a set of microservices.   
 
The consent expression component is composed of three microservices: a subject service, 
a consent directive service, and a resource(s) service. The consent enforcement component is also 
divided into three services: an authentication service, an authorization service, and a policy 
management service. Figure 3.1 illustrates the two components and the six services that make up 






Figure 3.1: C-ABAC Architecture Components and Services 
 
This chapter illustrates the overall structure of the C-ABAC model and the functions of 
each of its components. In section 3.1, we define the consent formal model. In Section 3.2, we 
outline the proposed overall system architecture and the interaction among the different 
components.  In Section 3.3 and Section 3.4, we describe in detail the system architecture and 
design to express consent and the authorization mechanism used to enforce consent. In Section 
3.5, we summarize the C-ABAC overall system architecture.  
3.1. Consent Format Model 
 
In this section, we present the C-ABAC consent formal model. This formalization provides a way 
to test the validity of the C-ABAC model by evaluating access requests for a given set of access 
policies against resources and performers. 
 
Consent directive is composed of a set of attributes that enables a patient to express his or 
her privacy wishes in a text/JSON format.  These consent directives are applied to resources (aka 
data objects) and performers (aka data requestors). Consent directives are converted into a set of 
access policies (aka rules). Performers request access to resources through the C-ABAC 
enforcement component.  Requests are evaluated by the C-ABAC enforcement component. 
3.1.1. Performer 
 
The performer is the entity agreeing to the policy and rules.  This could be a reference to an 
organization, a department, a role, or a caregiver. Figure 3.2 illustrates a directed acyclic graph 
(DAG) that represent performers. The performer graph represents a hierarchy similar to an 
organization chart. An access rule on a performer p is inherited by all successors of p.  For example, 
if a permission is given to the Primary care team, then the same permission is inherited by the 
Primary Care Doctor and the Primary Care Nurse by default. However, exception can be applied 
(e.g. Nurse, Nancy, can access Patient’s John’s medical records except his psychology reports 









The resource is the specific record to be accessed such as the patient, imaging study, medication 
and observation resources.  Figure 3.3 illustrates a directed acyclic graph that represent FHIR 








A rule, l, defines access control to resources and is composed of (u, p, r, s, a, e, b, n) where: 
• u is the patient or healthcare consumer to whom this consent applies to. 
• p is the performer or entity agreeing to the policy and rules. This could be a reference to 
an organization, patient, practitioner, related person or practitioner role. 
• r represents the requested resource such as observation, medication, immunization, and 
imaging study. 
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• s is the purpose of the consent directive such as care management, marketing, research, 
coverage under insurance policy, and clinical trial. 
• a is the operation that the performer wants to do on the resource. Example of actions 
includes collect, access, use, disclose, and correct.  
• e is the exception applied to resources and performers. 
• b is the security label applied to resources, data elements, and performers. 
• n is a number that defines the priority of access control rules. 
3.1.4. Request 
 
An access request, q, is represented by a tuple (u, p, r, s, a, e, b, n). The variables are described in 
section 3.1.3. 
 
Each request is made by one performer and targets a single resource.  The set of all possible 
requests from a policy, L, is defined as follows: REQUESTS (L) = U x P x R x S x A x E x B x N 
where: 
• U is the set of patients. 
• P is the set of performer identities. 
• R is the set of resources to be accessed. 
• S is the purpose of use. 
• A is the one action or set of actions that can be performed on the resources. 
• E is the set of exceptions. 
• B is the set of security labels. 
• N is the set of priorities of access control rules. 
 
3.1.5. Request Evaluation with Exceptions 
 
Given an access request q = (u, p, r, s, a, e, b, n) ∈	REQUESTS		for a given policy L the request 
will be evaluated using the function Requests (L, q) 
 
 Requests (L, q) = { l ∈	L 
  (matching_u (l, q) 
&&	matching_p (l, q) 
  &&	matching_r (l, q) 
  &&	matching_s (l, q) 
  &&	matching_a (l, q) 
  &&	matching_b (l, q) 
&&	matching_n (l, q)) 
  &&!(matching_u (l.e, q) 
|| matching_p (l.e, q) 
  ||	matching_r (l.e, q) 
  || matching_s (l.e, q) 
  || matching_a (l.e, q) 
  || matching_b (l.e, q) 
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|| matching_n (l.e, q)) 
  } 
Where 
• matching_u (l, q) represents the condition that the request q shares a common patient with 
rule l within the policy L. 
• matching_p (l, q) represents the condition that the request q shares a common performer 
with the rule l within the policy L. 
• matching_r (l, q) represents the condition that the resources targeted by the request q are a 
subset of those targeted by the rule l within the policy L. 
• matching_s (l, q) represents the condition that the purpose of uses targeted by the request 
q are a subset of those targeted by the rule l within the policy L. 
• matching_a (l, q) represents the condition that request q and the rule l share the same action 
within the policy L. 
• matching_b (l, q) represents the condition that request q and the rule l share the same 
security label within the policy L. 
• matching_n (l, q) represents the condition that request q and the rule l share the same 
priority within the policy L. 
• !matching_u (l.e, q) represents the condition that the request q does not encounter any 
exceptions assigned to the patient with the rule l within the policy L. 
• !matching_p (l.e, q) represents the condition that the request q does not run into exceptions 
assigned to the performer with the rule l within the policy L. 
• !matching_r (l.e, q) represents the condition that the resources targeted by the request q are 
not assigned any exceptions with the rule l within the policy L that prevent the request from 
being fulfilled.   
• !matching_s (l.e, q) represents the condition that the purpose of uses targeted by the request 
q does not encounter any exceptions in rule l within the policy L. 
• !matching_a (l.e, q) represents the condition that request q does not run into exception 
regarding the action to be performed with the rule l within policy L. 
• !matching_b (l.e, q) represents the condition that request q does not encounter conflicting 
security labels in rule l within the policy L. 
• !matching_n (l.e, q) represents the condition that request q does not encounter conflicting 
priority in rule l within the policy L. 
 
3.1.6. Request Evaluation with Deny Rule 
 
Given an access request q = (u, p, r, s, a, e, b, n) ∈	REQUESTS		for a given policy L the request 
will be evaluated using the function Requests (L, q). 
 
The following request is evaluated using two rules: Accepted rule and Denied rule: 
 
 Requests (L, q) = { l ∈	L	
	 	 	l.type	=	ACCEPT 
  && matching_u (l, q) 
&&	matching_p (l, q) 
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  &&	matching_r (l, q) 
  &&	matching_s (l, q) 
  &&	matching_a (l, q) 
  &&	matching_b (l, q) 
  &&	matching_n (l, q) 
  && (! m ∈	L	
	 	 m.type	=	DENY	
	 	 && matching_u (m, q) 
&&	matching_p (m, q) 
  &&	matching_r (m, q) 
  &&	matching_s (m, q) 
  &&	matching_a (m, q) 
  &&	matching_b (m, q) 
&&	matching_n (m, q)) 
  } 
Where 
• m rule does not exist in policy L 
3.1.7. Example 
 
Patient John with an identity of patient34567 wants to restrict access to his behavioral diagnostic 
report, dr1, to only his psychologist, Dr. Suzan with an identity of performer123475.   
 
John is able to manage four of his resources: observation heart/pulse rate (ob1), imaging 
study (is1), personal fitness activity (ob2), and behavioral health diagnostic report (dr1). 
 
• Param.Resources = res1 (group of resources) = {ob1, is1, ob2, dr1} 
Medical records are considered resources. Patient John was given access to manage a 
resource group, res1 composed of four distinct resources: ob1, is1, ob2, and dr1. 
• Param.DataType = {ob1  ↦  Observation, is1  ↦  ImagingStudy, ob1  ↦  Observation, dr1  
↦  Diagnostic Report} 
DataType is the category of the medical record.   res1 is composed of four data types: 
observation, imaging study, observation and diagnostic report. 
• Param.Pvaluation= 
{ob1 ↦ {Patient ↦ John, Encounter ↦ 1, Observation ↦ 1} 
{ig1 ↦ {Patient ↦ John, Encounter ↦ 1, ImagingStudy ↦ 1} 
{ob2 ↦ {Patient ↦ John, Encounter ↦ 1, Observation ↦ 2} 
{dr1 ↦ {Patient ↦ John, Encounter ↦ 2, Diagnostic Report ↦ 1}} 
Encounter is an interaction between a patient and healthcare professional for the purpose 
of providing healthcare services or assessing the health status of a patient [127].  Patient 
John has two encounters.  Encounter 1 generated three resources: ob1, is1, and ob2. 
Encounter 2 generated one resource: dr1. 
 





Rule Resource (r) Patient (u) Performer (p) Priority Action Exception 
l1 res1.all patient34567 performer123475 2 Read None 
l2 res1.all patient34567 performer0987 2 Read Access res1.all 
except dr1 
l3 res1.all patient34567 performer97463 2 Read Access res1.all 
except dr1 
 
Table 3.1: Rules 
 
• performer123475 is granted access to patient34567 resources, res1.all. 
• performer0987 and performer97463 are granted access to patient34567 resources, res1.all, 
with the exception of dr1.   
• The priority is an attribute that allows patient John to priorities his rules in order of 
importance.  The first priority in the list will be evaluated first.   
• There are three rules (l1, l2, and l3) that are part of policy, L1. 
• Let’s assume that Dr. Nadia with an identity of performer97463 issues a request, q1, to 
access dr1, the only rule that will be evaluated as part q1 is rule l3: 
 Rules (L1, q1) = {l3} 
 
Rule Result Description 
matching_u (l3, q1) 
 
True Represents the condition that the request q1 shares a common 
patient , patient34567, with rule l3 within the policy L1. 
matching_p  (l3, q1) True Represents the condition that the request q1 shares a common 
performer, performer97463, with the rule l3 within the policy 
L1. 
matching_r (l1, q1) False Represents the condition that the resource targeted by the request 
q1 is not a subset of those targeted by the rule l3 within the policy 
L1 and for this reason the request to access dr1 is denied. 
 
Table 3.2: Request, q1, Evaluation 
 
• As part of rule, l3, performer97463 is able access all resources, res1.all, except dr1. 
• The access request q1 to dr1 from performer97463 is not granted because the condition 
that the resource targeted by the request q1 is not a subset of those targeted by the rule l3 
within the policy L1.  
3.2. C-ABAC Overall System Architecture 
3.2.1. Component Diagram 
 
The C-ABAC system architecture is composed of two distinct components: (1) a consent 
expression component and (2) a consent enforcement component.  The model encompasses two 







Figure 3.4: Patient Consent Expression Data Flow  
 
In Section 3.3, we discuss the consent expression data flows (1, 13, 14, 15 and 16 from Figure 
3.4), illustrate the use cases to express consent and detail the three services (subject service, 
consent directive service, and resource service) that are the building blocks of the consent directive 
expression component. 
 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the performer data flow: 
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Figure 3.5: Performer Data Flow 
 
Figure 3.5 data flows are discussed in Section 3.4. The next two sections discuss the 
technology stack used and the API guidelines that the C-ABAC model adheres to. 
3.2.2. Technology Stack 
 
We adopted a microservice architecture in which each service is self-contained with its own 
RESTful API endpoint.  Since we implemented the HAPI-FHIR [128] open source library to test 
the validity of the C-ABAC model, we use the same programming language to create the HAPI 
library, namely the Java programming language.  The HAPI-FHIR is a Java software library that 
exposes the power of the FHIR's RESTful server functionalities to a software application [129].  
The development framework and technologies used are all open source and do not require any 
licensing or subscription fees.   
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3.2.3. API Guidelines 
 
The C-ABAC model is composed of six distinct and self-contained services: (1) a consent directive 
service, (2) a subject service, (3) a resource service, (4) an authentication service, (5) an 
authorization service and (6) a policy management service.  The six services follow the FHIR 
RESTful API specification [130].  Each service is a collection of coherent API resources [uniform 
resource identifiers (URIs)] at a single endpoint, under a single API base path, with its own security 
scheme and API version for the service. Every API service has a formal Swagger (YAML) 
specification [131] that corresponds to the external API version of the API service. 
 
3.3. Consent Expression System Architecture 
 
This section defines the architecture subcomponents used to express consent. 
3.3.1. Purpose 
 
The purpose of the privacy consent directive is to define a set of policies on how personal health 
information (PHI) is to be collected, accessed, used and disclosed [132].  A privacy consent 
directive is a legal record of a patient’s agreement with a party responsible for enforcing the 
patient’s choices. The following actors are involved in managing the patient consent directive: 
 
• Patient (Data Owner): This is the person who determines the scope of consent that will be 
granted.  Once consent is requested and agreed to, the privacy policies within the consent 
directive apply to the patient. 
• Performer (Data Requestor): This is the actor who is agreeing to the policy and rules. The 
performer is the entity responsible for complying with the consent directive and enforcing 
it.  The performer can be the patient, organization, practitioner, role, care team and related 
person. 
• Organization (Consent Custodian): This is the organization that manages the consent and 
the framework within which it is executed.   
3.3.2. System Architecture 
 





Figure 3.6: Consent Expression System Architecture 
 
Three microservices make up the consent expression system architecture: the subject 
service, the consent directive service and the resource service. The subject service allows system 
actors such as patients, caregivers, administrators and consuming applications to register with the 
third-party data custodian to start using the different consent-centric services. The consent 
directive service allows system actors to manage consent directives in a centralized directive data 
store. The resource service allows patients to create one or many data objects (known as resources) 
to share.   
 
Since each service is self-contained, we create three different data stores to hold the data 
for each service: Subject Store, Consent Directive Store and Resource(s) Store.  The Subject Store 
holds data attributes of patients, organizations, practitioners, roles, care teams and related persons.  
The Consent Directive Store holds attributes regarding privacy rules and exceptions to the privacy 
rules.  The Resource(s) Store holds data objects to share, such as observations, medications, 
imaging studies and immunization records. 
3.3.3. Use Cases 
 
The following use cases are addressed as part of the consent expression component: 
 
• Create credentials: The patient creates his or her login credentials through the personal 
health record (PHR) application to access the centralized consent management system. 
• Login: The patient logs in to the PHR application using his or her login credentials. 
• Create consent: The patient creates one or many consents that can be applied to different 
actors, organizations, roles and practitioners within the context of HIEs. 
• Retrieve consent: The patient reviews existing consents by retrieving them from the 
centralized consent directive through the PHR application. 
• Update consent: The patient is able to update existing consents either by removing or 
granting permissions to data requestors. 
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• Delete consent: The patient is able to delete existing consents and disable access to specific 
data objects. 
 
Figure 3.7 illustrates the consent expression use cases: 
 
Figure 3.7: Consent Expression Use Cases 
 
3.3.4. Data Contract 
 
The privacy consent directive data model used throughout this thesis is a simplified version of the 
FHIR consent directive [14] and it is modeled in a JavaScript object notation (JSON) format.  Table 
3.3 lists the different data attributes of the consent directive used to enforce privacy policies. 
 
Property Name Value Data Type Mandatory Description 
resourceType consent Text Y A record of a healthcare 
consumer’s choices, which 
permits or denies identified 
recipient(s) or recipient role(s) to 
perform one or more actions 
within a given policy context, for 
specific purposes and periods of 
time. 
Identifier Unique identifier UUID Y Unique identifier for this copy of 
the consent statement. 
Patient Reference UUID Y The patient or healthcare 
consumer to whom this consent 
applies. 
Performer Reference UUID N Entity agreeing to the policy and 
rules. This could be a reference to 
an organization, patient, 
practitioner, related person or 
practitioner role. 
Organization Reference UUID N Custodian of the consent. 
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Status Enumeration values Text Y Indicates the current state of this 
consent. Can be any of the 
following coded values: draft, 
proposed, active, rejected, inactive 
or entered-in-error. 
Scope Codable Concept Text Y This is an extensible list of 
selectors of the type of consent 
being presented, such as privacy, 
treatment or research.  
dateTime Timestamp Timestamp N Indicates when the consent was 
issued, created or indexed. 
policyRule Reference UUID N A reference to a set of policies and 
permissions retrieved from 
XACML, from a rules engine or 
from a JSON policy repository.  
Exception.performer Reference UUID N Exception to the main policyRule. 
Can be applied to an organization, 
a patient, a practitioner, a related 
person or a practitioner role. 
Exception.data Reference UUID N Exception to the main policyRule. 
Can be applied to any data object, 
such as an observation, an imaging 
study or a medication. 
Exception.securityLabel Reference UUID N Exception to the main policyRule. 
Can be applied using a security 
label either at the resource level or 
at the data attribute level. 
Exception.action Enumeration values Text N Actions controlled by this rule, 
such as the permission to collect, 
access, use, disclose or correct. 
Exception.period Timestamp Timestamp N Exception to the main policyRule 
indicates the specific period of 
time during which exception can 
be applied 
 
Table 3.3: Consent Expression Data Attributes 
 
Figure 3.8 is the consent resource data contract in JSON format.  The JSON schema is a 
standard used for describing JSON objects. For more information, see http://json-schema.org/. 
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Figure 3.8: Consent Directive Data Contract in JSON Format 
3.3.5. Data Model 
 





Figure 3.9: Consent Expression Data Model 
 
• Consent: Holds the main consent directive attributes and references to other data objects, 
including the patient identifier, performer identifier, policy identifier and exception 
identifier. 
• Patient: Holds the patient unique identifier and patient name.   
• Policy: Stores the link to the policy rule, such as an extensible access control markup 
language (XACML) policy rule or a JSON policy rule. 
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• Performer: Holds attributes about performers, including the performer identifier. This 
identifier can be any of the following types: organization, patient, practitioner, related 
person, role, care team or practitioner role. 
• Exception: Holds exceptions to the main policyRule that can be applied either to a 
performer or to a data object. 
• SecurityLabel: Holds security metadata that can be applied to a policyRule, a data object 
or a performer. 
3.3.6. Schema 
 
For the data model creation, we use Apache Cassandra.  Cassandra is a highly scalable, high-
performance NoSQL database designed to handle large amounts of data across many commodity 
servers, providing high availability with no single point of failure [133]. Cassandra excels at (near) 
real-time high-speed writes and reads. For the schema creation, we use the Cassandra Query 
Language (CQL).  CQL offers a model close to SQL.  
 
3.3.7. Design 
3.3.7.1. Component Diagram 
 
To meet the “separation of concerns” key characteristic requirement from Chapter 1, we use a 
microservice architecture where each component “should do one thing and do it well” [51]. The 
following are the three microservices that make up the consent expression component: subject 
service, consent directive service and resource service. The following is the API URI structure for 
each service: 
 
• Subject service: https://<host>/subject 
• Consent directive service: https://<host>/consent 
• Resource service: https://<host>/resource 
 




Figure 3.10: Services Component Diagram 
 
• The Request Validator validates the application signature and the user access token. 
• The Service Controller provides a REST interface to handle incoming requests.  The 
controller performs validation and returns appropriates HTTP response codes.  
• The Service Implementation implements the business logic to create, retrieve, update and 
delete resources.   
• The Persistence Service is responsible for providing technology independent service to 
store data into multiple database technology. 
 
All services expose their functionalities as RESTful endpoints.  The services support JSON 
presentations.  To protect the system, all APIs are exposed using the HTTPs channel, and an access 
token is used to establish the validity of the user session. 
3.3.7.2. Subject Service  
 
The subject service allows users and consuming applications to register with the data custodian to 
use the centralized consent directive store to manage, use and enforce consent directives.  The 
subject service enables four HTTP operations: POST, GET, PUT and DELETE.  
 
The subject can be any of the following types: patient, consuming application, 
organization, practitioner, related person, role, care team or practitioner role.  Figure 3.11 provides 
the two data models that represent subject. 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Subject Data Model 
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The patient data model contains basic attributes of patient demographics. The performer 
data model contains basic attributes of the consuming application, organization, practitioner, 
related person, and practitioner role.   
 
The component diagram in Figure 3.12 outlines the four subcomponents of the subject service. 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Subject Service Component Diagram 
3.3.7.3. Resource(s) Service  
 
The resources(s) service allows patients to manage the sharing of their own electronic medical 
records through the PHR application. The C-ABAC model manages all electronic records or 
references those records using the FHIR specifications [14].   The following are examples of the 
FHIR resources that patients can manage using the C-ABAC model: 
 
• Patient demographics: This resource includes information about the patient such as name, 
birth date, gender, contact information, marital status, language preferences and primary 
care physician. 
• Imaging study: This resource provides information about digital imaging and 
communication (DICOM) studies, such as mammogram studies, liver studies and brain 
studies. 
• Observation: This resource captures information about vital signs (e.g. body weight, blood 
pressure and temperature), laboratory data (e.g. blood glucose), imaging results (e.g. bone 
density) and device measurements (e.g. EKG data and pulse oximetry data). 
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• Medication: This resource stores information about medication, such as their ingredients, 
strengths and dosages (e.g. number of tablets or volume). 
 
Figure 3.13 depicts examples of the FHIR data models we use to test the C-ABAC model. 
 
 
Figure 3.13: FHIR Data Models 
 
The complete list of FHIR resources can be found online at the HL7 organization website 
[14]. 
 
Most of the resources are available through the hospital’s electronic medical record system. 
These resources cannot be altered or deleted by the patient, thus the resource(s) service offers 
patients only the ability to retrieve and share their health information resources with performers 
within the context of an HIE.  The Figure 3.14 component diagram outlines the four 
subcomponents of the resource(s) service. 
 
 
Figure 3.14: FHIR Resource(s) Service Component Diagram 
  
 44 
3.3.7.4. Consent Directive Service  
 
This is the key component of the C-ABAC model, where patients are able to express consent in a 
standardized format using the FHIR specifications.  The consent directive service allows patients 
to manage their privacy rules and exceptions to these rules (e.g. “Grant Dr. Bob access to all my 
medical records except my mental and behavioral health diagnostic assessment”).  The service 
enables four HTTP operations: POST, GET, PUT and DELETE.  The patient can store one or 
many consent directives and can retrieve them to review, update or delete them.  Figure 3.15 
depicts the consent directive data model. 
 
 
Figure 3.15: Consent Directive Data Model 
 




Figure 3.16: Consent Directive Service Component Diagram 
 
3.4. Consent Enforcement System Architecture 
 
This section defines the architecture subcomponents to enforce consent and the design of the three 
microservices that make up the consent enforcement component of the C-ABAC model. Figure 
3.17 illustrates these three microservices: (1) authentication service, (2) authorization service and 




Figure 3.17: Consent Enforcement Microservices 
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3.4.1. Authentication Service 
 
Authentication is the process of verifying the user’s credentials.  The authentication service of the 
C-ABAC model is built using OpenID Connect (OIDC) with SpringBoot and Spring Security. 
OIDC is an OAuth 2.0 framework that provides the user’s identity as an access token.  Spring 
Security automatically translates the access token into a Java principal. The Spring Security 
principal stores the details of the principal currently interacting with the C-ABAC model. 
 
OIDC provides features such as a UserInfo endpoint for getting user information, a 
standard set of scopes and a standardized implementation of the access token using a JSON web 




Figure 3.18: Authentication Component Diagram 
 
1. The user requests access to a resource from the resource provider. The resource provider 
(relaying party) is able to relay access control to a third party OIDC identity provider. 
2. The relaying party returns a list of approved identity providers (IdPs). 
3. The user selects the IdP to use and provide his or her login credentials with the IdP. 
4. The relaying party sends the login credentials to the OIDC server to obtain an 
authorization access token that allows access to the resource. 
5. The IdP responds with an access token if the request is granted. 
 
3.4.2. Authorization Service 
 
Authorization is the process of deciding whether a user (a patient or a performer) is allowed to 
perform an action (write, read, update or delete) with a protected resource. This section outlines 
the authorization service’s design and architecture subcomponents. 
3.4.2.1. Component Diagram 
 
Compared to other access control frameworks where enforcement can be achieved in many ways, 
ABAC has a standard and a reference architecture for enabling enforcement.  The ABAC standard 
features make it portable and easy to integrate with existing applications through the policy 
enforcement point (PEP) interface.  The ABAC standard is published by the US National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST) [134].   Figure 3.19 illustrates the ABAC reference 




Figure 3.19: Consent Enforcement Component Diagram with Data Flows 
 
• The PEP enforces policy decisions in response to a request from a performer (data 
requestor) for access to a protected FHIR resource.  The access control decisions are made 
by the PDP. 
• The PDP computes access decisions by evaluating attributes from the PIP and policies from 
PRP. 
• The PIP is the source of attributes or data required for policy evaluation by the PDP to 
make the decisions. 
• The PRP provides consent directives and policies that the PDP should comply with. 
• The PAP provides a user interface for creating, managing, testing and debugging DPs and 
MPs and for choosing the appropriate repository for storing these policies. 
3.4.2.2. Design 
 
The following use case is an example of an authorization problem the C-ABAC authorization 
service can solve:  
 
Patient John created a consent directive to share his imaging study resource with Dr. Bob, 
who is in the radiologist role, as long as Dr. Bob is accessing the resource from the Grand 
River Hospital’s approved device and not from the St. Mary’s General Hospital’s approved 




Figure 3.20 depicts the imagingstudy.read permission given by Patient John to Dr. Bob to 




Figure 3.20: Authorization Use Case 
 
The ABAC framework uses attributes to decide whether to grant or deny access to the 
protected resource.  Each attribute consists of a key-value pair, such as “Role=Radiologist and 
Action=Read.”  Figure 3.21 illustrates the attributes the authorization service uses to make an 
access control decision in John’s use case (Figure 3.20).  Dr. Bob should use his login credential 
DrBob@GrandRiverHospital to access the ImagingStudy123 resource that belongs to patient 




Figure 3.21: Attributes Used by the Authorization service 
 
The components of the authorization service include the following: 
 
• Subject attributes: A repository that includes patient and performer attributes. For 
example, John is a patient of Grand River Hospital, and Dr. Bob is a member of the 
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radiologist role and a staff member of both Grand River and St. Mary’s General 
hospitals. 
• Resource attributes: A repository of FHIR resources, such as the imaging study 
resource. 
• Policy repository: A repository of how subject and resource attributes combine to 
determine privileges.  For example, both John and Dr. Bob are members of the Grand 
River Hospital. 
• Policy evaluation: Given a subject, an action and a resource, the policy evaluation 
should determine whether the operation is allowed. For example, Dr. Bob (subject) is 
allowed to read patient John’s imaging study (resource) as long as he is accessing the 
resource from a Grand River Hospital-approved device (environment) and is using his 
Grand River login credentials (DrBob@GrandRiverHospital). 
 
Figure 3.22 diagrams the authorization service component and the data flows to request an 
imagingstudy resource from a resource(s) data store on behalf of DrBob@GrandRiverHospital. 
 
 
Figure 3.22: Authorization Service Component Diagram and Data Flow 
3.4.2.3. Implementation 
 
The C-ABAC authorization service is built using Spring Security and its Spring expression 
language (SpEL). Spring Security is a comprehensive framework for authentication and 
authorization for Java-based applications built on top of the Spring framework. Spring Security 
supports access control mechanisms at either a URI level, a method level or a fine-grained level 
using an access control list. Spring Security separates authentication from authorization.  The 
Spring Security framework is very useful when developers want to inject their access control logic 
as a centralized component and enforce it in various places in an application, such as before or 
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after REST API calls and methods. Spring Security provides all necessary data for access control 
logic to work like parameters or objects. 
 
The following are the components for creating a SpringBoot-based authorization service: 
• Subject and resource repositories: These are created as part of the consent expression 
component. Both repositories feed information into the policy repository and policy 
evaluation. 
• Policy repository: The policies are stored in JSON format in a Cassandra data model.  
The Cassandra policy repository contains access rules that use SpEL Boolean 
expressions such as Role == Radiologist.   
• Policy evaluation: A centralized component loads all rule expressions to make a 
decision on whether to grant or deny access. 
• PEP: Rules are enforced using Spring annotations, such as @PostAuthorize and 
@PreAuthorize. These annotations apply method security and support SpEL 
expression evaluation. @PreAuthorize checks for authorization before entering a method. 
@PostAuthorize checks for authorization after method execution.  
 
The entry point for ABAC logic is the PermissionEvaluatorHandler component. This 
component delegates all decisions made by spring security annotations such as @PostAuthorize 
and @PreAuthorize.  The next component is the optional ContextAwarePolicyEnforcement 
component, which can be called at any point in the code and is completed using authenticated user 
information.  
 
Decision computation, Figure 3.23, takes places in the PolicyEnforcement class. 





Figure 3.23: PolicyEnforcement.java 
 
The policy repository is discussed in the next section. 
3.4.3. Policy Management Service 
 
The policy management service is a SpringBoot-based application that includes a centralized 
data store holding policy rules in a JSON format.  Each rule consists of the following keys: 
resourceType, ruleName, ruleDescription, ruleRequestorSubject, ruleTargetSubject, 
ruleTargetResource and rulePermission. The following is a rule applied to John’s use case to 
meet his privacy wishes.  Dr. Bob with credential DrBob@GrandRiverHospital is allowed to 
retrieve protected resource ImagingStudy123, which belongs to patient John123. 
 
{   
   "resourceType": "PolicyRule", 
   "ruleName": "Radiologist", 
   "ruleDescription": "Member of the Care Team", 
   "ruleRequestorSubject": "DrBob@GrandRiverHospital", 
   "ruleTargetSubject": "/Patient/John123", 
   "ruleTargetResource": "/ImagingStudy123", 







In this chapter we outlined the system architecture and design and the technology stack used to 
create C-ABAC’s two main components: (1) the consent expression component and (2) the consent 
enforcement component.  We also divided each component into a set of microservices to achieve 
the “separation of concerns” key characteristic requirement from Chapter 1. The consent 
expression component is divided into three microservices: (1) a subject service, (2) a resource 
service and (3) a consent directive service.  The consent enforcement component is also divided 
into three microservices: (1) an authentication service, (2) an authorization service and (3) a policy 
management service. 
 
The next chapter, Chapter 4, discusses the applicability of the C-ABAC in preserving a 
patient’s privacy in a healthcare setting: 
 
• We determine whether our proposed model adequately addresses the design goals that 
have been laid out in Chapter 1. 
• We examine the feasibility of our C-ABAC model by testing its features against  the 
University Health Network HAPI-FHIR public server (https://fhirtest.uhn.ca/). This 
server stores over 1 million test patient demographics and medical records, including 
over 100,000 observations, over 20,000 medical statement and over 7,000 encounters.   





4. Testing and Validation 
 
In this chapter, we provide use cases for how the consent-centric attribute-based access control (C-
ABAC) model can be applied in real-world scenarios. We also test and validate the C-ABAC 
model against a publicly available health data set from the Ontario University Health Network 
(UHN) server [69], and we determine whether the proposed C-ABAC model adequately addresses 
the design goals and optimistic requirements from Chapter 1. 
4.1. C-ABAC Applicability 
 
This section illustrates the applicability of the proposed C-ABAC model through a set of use cases, 











Table 4.1: Applicability Use Cases 
4.1.1. Use Case 1 – Data Sharing 
4.1.1.1. Purpose and Workflow 
 
The purpose of use Case 1 is to allow patients to share their personal health records, including their 
daily exercise activities, with health information exchange (HIE) participants.  In this scenario, 
Sarah uses her Fitbit Activity Tracker device to monitor her physical exercises.  The Fitbit collects 
Sarah’s data and automatically sends it to the Fitbit cloud using Wi-Fi or a cellular data network.  
Sarah is also a patient at the Grand River Hospital and a user of the Ontario HIE application.  This 
application allows its users to share their Fitbit activity data with other Ontario HIE participants.  
Sarah wants to share her Fitbit data with her primary physician, Dr. Smith 
(DrSmith@GrandRiverHospital).  Figure 4.1 illustrates the workflow for sharing data between two 




Use Case Name 
1 Data sharing 
2 Data collection for secondary use 
3 Consent update 
4 Consent codifiability 
5 Consent interoperability 




Figure 4.1: Data Share Workflow  
 
• Step 1: The Fitbit device collects activity data. 
• Step 2: The device stores activity data in the Fitbit cloud. 
• Step 3: Sarah authorizes the Ontario HIE application to retrieve the Fitbit data using the C-
ABAC authorization service. 
• Step 4: The Ontario HIE application accesses the Fitbit API to retrieve the data. 
• Step 5: Sarah fills out a consent directive using the C-ABAC centralized consent directive 
service to share her Fitbit data with Dr. Smith.  
• Step 6: Sarah's Fitbit data is stored in the Ontario HIE application and is available to Dr. Smith 
in read-only form. 
4.1.1.2. Mapping 
 
The Ontario HIE application uses the centralized C-ABAC services to enable the following 
features: authentication, subject management, resource management, policy management, 
consent management and authorization. 
 
• Authentication: Sarah uses her login credentials with the C-ABAC authentication service to 
log in to the Ontario HIE application.  
• Subject management: Both Sarah’s and Dr. Smith’s information is stored in the C-ABAC 
subject data store.  Sarah’s unique identifier is 678900 and Dr. Smith’s is 937930.  Figure 4.2 
presents these resources in JavaScript object notation (JSON) format. 
 
Sarah’s Resource Dr. Smith’s Resource 
{   
   "resourceType":"Patient", 
   "identifier":"678900", 
   "name":"Sarah", 
   "Organization":"64537237 " 
} 
{   
   "resourceType":"Performer", 
   "identifier":"937930", 
   "name":"Dr. Smith", 
   "Organization":"64537237 " 
} 
 
Figure 4.2: C-ABAC Patient and Performer Resources 
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• Resource management: References to shared resources are stored in the C-ABAC resource 
data store. Figure 4.3 contains a sample Fitbit JSON data object. 
 
{   
   "resourceType":"Fitbit", 
   "identifier":"3330900", 
   "patient":"678900 // Sarah's unique identifier within the Ontario HIE system", 
   "activity":"running", 
   "distance":"7 miles", 
   "duration":"60 min", 
   "activityCalories":"550 calories" 
} 
Figure 4.3: Fitbit Activity Resource 
 
• Policy management: As part of the consent directive, Sarah creates a policy (Figure 4.4) that 
allows Dr. Smith to view her Fitbit exercise activities. 
 
{   
   "resourceType":"PolicyRule", 
   "identifier":"57890", 
   "ruleName":"PrimaryCarePhysician", 
   "ruleDescription":"Member of the Care Team", 
   "ruleRequestorSubject":" /Performer/937930", 
   "ruleTargetSubject":"/Patient/678900", 
   "ruleTargetResource":"/Fitbit/", 
   "rulePermission":"GET" 
} 
Figure 4.4: Policy 
 
• Consent management: Sarah is able to use the consent service to create a consent directive 
that meets her privacy requirements, as detailed in Figure 4.5. 
 
{   
   "resourceType":"Consent", 
   "identifier":"199990", 
   "patient":"678900 // Sarah's unique identifier within the Ontario HIE system", 
   "performer":"937930 //Dr. Smith's unique identifier within the Ontaior HIE system", 
   "organization":"64537237 //Grand River Hosptial organization unique  
      identifier within the Ontario HIE system", 
   "status":"active //status indicates that the consent directive is active", 
   "scope":"Privacy // scope indicates that this consent directive is created  
      for the purpose of privacy", 
   "dateTime":"2019-05-05T15:04:51.559Z", 
   "policyRule":"policy/57890 //link to the policy that needs to be applied  
      to this consent directive", 
} 
Figure 4.5: Consent Directive 
 
• Authorization evaluation: Sarah (678900) is granting Dr. Smith (937930) read-only 
permission (resource.GET) to all her Fitbit resources (Figure 4.6). 
 
function request { 
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  if (requestorSubject == 937930 and targetSubject == 678900 and targetResource.equals ("Fitbit") 
{ 
    return "resource.get"; 
  } else { 
    return "resource.denied"; 
  } 
} 
 
Figure 4.6: Policy Evaluation 
4.1.1.3. Rule Evaluation 
 
The following table outlines rules that belong to policy, P1. 
Rule Resource (r) Patient (u) Performer (p) Order Action Exception Condition 
r1 Fitbit 678900 937930 1 read None True 
 
Dr. Smith issues a request, q1, to access Sarah’s Fitbit data: 
Rules (P1, q1) = {r1} 
Evaluate (P1, q1) = TRUE 
4.1.1.4. Applicability 
 
The C-ABAC model meets the “choice” requirement, as Sarah is able to create a consent directive 
that meets her privacy requirements using the C-ABAC consent directive service.  Sarah can 
authorize data sharing between two applications (Fitbit cloud and Ontario HIE application), and 
Dr. Smith can view her Fitbit activity data using the policy management service. 
4.1.2.  Use Case 2 – Data Collection for Secondary Use 
4.1.2.1. Purpose and Workflow 
 
Use Case 2 is about data collection for the purpose of research. In this use case, Jack uses his 
electric toothbrush to transmit his teeth cleaning habits through Bluetooth to a mobile application 
and from the mobile application to the cloud.  Cleaning habits include the number of times he uses 
the toothbrush, duration, location data, pressure sensor data and scrubbing sensor data.  A member 
of the research team at the Grand River Hospital, Sofia hopes to use the data from Jack’s toothbrush 
to train a new algorithm.  Jack wants to share his teeth cleaning habits without sharing his 
personally identifiable information (PII), such as his name, address, data of birth and email. Figure 




Figure 4.7: Secondary Data Use Workflow 
 
• Step 1: Jack uses his electric toothbrush. 
• Step 2: The electric toothbrush transmits data via Bluetooth to a mobile application. 
• Step 3: The mobile application transmits data via Wi-Fi or a cellular data network to the cloud. 
• Step 4: Jack authorizes the Ontario HIE application to retrieve the data from his account in the 
cloud. 
• Step 5: The Ontario HIE application retrieves the activity data from the cloud. 
• Step 6: Jack completes his consent directive using the C-ABAC centralized consent directive 
service allowing his electric toothbrush activity data to be shared with the researcher Sofia 
(Sofia@GrandRiverHospital).  
• Step 7: Jack shares his de-identified data set with Sofia@GrandRiverHospital. The data set 
includes the number of times the toothbrush is used, duration, location data, pressure sensor 
data, and scrubbing sensor data.  The demographics data set is not shared with Sofia. 
4.1.2.2. Mapping 
 
Jack uses the C-ABAC services to share data for a secondary purpose (e.g. research): 
 
• Authentication service: Jack uses the C-ABAC authentication service to log in to the 
Ontario HIE application. 
• Subject service: Both Sofia’s and Jack’s information is stored in the C-ABAC subject data 
store. Sofia’s unique identifier is 345509 and Jack’s is 790876. 
 
Jack’s Resource Sofia’s Resource 
{   
   "resourceType":"Patient", 
   "identifier":"790876", 
   "name":"Jack", 
   "Organization":"64537237 " 
} 
{   
   "resourceType":"Performer", 
   "identifier":"345509", 
   "name":"Sofia", 
   "Organization":"64537237 " 
} 
 
Figure 4.8: Patient and Performer Resources 
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• Resource service: Jack’s toothbrush activity is retrieved from the cloud and stored in the 
C-ABAC resource data store.  The following  is Jack’s toothbrushing activity: 
 
{   
   "resourceType":"ElectricToothbrush ", 
   "identifier":"849490", 
   "patient":"790876 ", 
   "activity":"Dental Cleaning", 
   "duration":"1 min", 
   "location":"Top teeth", 
   "pressureSensor":"12", 
   "scrubbingSensor":"50" 
} 
 
• Policy Management Service: Jack creates a policy to share his toothbrush data with 
Sofia, as shown in Figure 4.9. 
 
{   
   "resourceType":"PolicyRule", 
   "identifier":"109876", 
   "ruleName":"Researcher", 
   "ruleDescription":"Member of the Research Team", 
  "ruleRequestorSubject":" /Performer/345509", 
   "ruleTargetSubject":"/Patient/790876", 
   "ruleTargetResource":"/toothbrush/", 
   "rulePermission":"GET" 
} 
 
Figure 4.9: Policy  
 
• Consent directive service: Jack creates a consent directive to share his toothbrush activity 
data but not his demographic data with Sofia by using the exception section of the consent 
directive data contract (Figure 4.10). 
 
{   
   "resourceType":"Consent", 
   "identifier":"199998", 
   "patient":"/Patient/790876 ", 
   "performer":"/Performer/345509", 
   "organization":"64537237 //Grand River Hosptial organization unique  
      identifier within the Ontario HIE system", 
   "status":"active //status indicates that the consent directive is active", 
   "scope":"Privacy // scope indicates that this consent directive is created  
      for the purpose of privacy", 
   "dateTime":"2019-05-05T15:04:51.559Z", 
   "policyRule":"policy/109876 //link to the policy that needs to be applied  
      to this consent directive", 
   "exception":{   
      "performer":"/Performer/345509", 
      "data":"/PatientDemographic/657365 ", 
      "securityLabel":"denied", 
      "action":"unauthorized", 
      "period":"all" 
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   } 
} 
Figure 4.10: Consent Directive  
 
• Authorization evaluation: An example is given in Figure 4.11. 
function requestResearch { 
if (requestorSubject == 345509 and targetSubject == 790876 and targetResource.equals 
("touthbrush") { 
return "resource.touthbrush.get" and “resource.patientDemographic.denied) 





Figure 4.11: Policy Evaluation 
4.1.2.3. Rule Evaluation 
 
The following table outlines rules that belong to policy, P1. 
Rule Resource (r) Patient (u) Performer (p) Order Action Exception Condition 
r1 Patient 790876 345509 1 read None True 
r2 Electric 
Toothbrush 
790876 345509 1 read None False 
 
Sofia issues a request, q1, to access Jack’s patient demographics: 
Rules (P1, q1) = {r2} 
Evaluate (P1, q1) = FALSE 
 
Sofia issues a request, q2, to access Jack’s Electric Toothbrush: 
Rules (P1, q2) = {r1} 
Evaluate (P1, q2) = TRUE 
The request to access Jack’s Electric Toothbrush is approved. 
4.1.2.4. Applicability 
 
Use Case 2 meets the “granular” requirement. Jacks fills out a consent directive to share de-
identified data on his electric toothbrush activity with Sofia@GrandRiverHospital.  Jack is able to 
share a specific data set (“share only de-identified data set”). 
4.1.3. Use Case 3 – Consent Update 
4.1.3.1. Purpose and Workflow 
 
Use case 3 is about revoking consent after a data breach. In this scenario, Sarah receives an alert 
from the Ontario HIE application that there has been a data breach of the Grand River Hospital 
systems.  She is concerned that her demographics data and her Fitbit activity data might be stolen 
and misused.  Sarah takes actions to update her consent by revoking it and not allowing data 
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Figure 4.12: Consent Update Workflow 
 
 
• Step 1: The Fitbit device collects activity data. 
• Step 2: Activity data is stored in the Fitbit cloud. 
• Step 3: Sarah revokes her authorization that had allowed the Ontario HIE application to 
retrieve her Fitbit activity data. 
• Step 4: The Ontario HIE application is no longer authorized to retrieve the Fitbit activity data 
from the Fitbit cloud. 
• Step 5: Sarah revokes her consent by updating the consent directive through the Ontario HIE 
portal. 
• Step 6: The Grand River Hospital care team, including DrSmith@GrandRiverHospital, no 




Sarah is able to deny access to her Fitbit data by simply updating her policy 57890 (Figure 4.13) 
from GET to DENY. “DENY” means that Dr. Smith with an identity of 937930 is no longer able 
to retrieve Sarah’s Fitbit activity data. 
{   
   "resourceType":"PolicyRule", 
   "identifier":"57890", 
   "ruleName":"PrimaryCarePhysician", 
   "ruleDescription":"Member of the Care Team", 
   "ruleRequestorSubject":" /Performer/937930", 
   "ruleTargetSubject":"/Patient/678900", 
   "ruleTargetResource":"/Fitbit/", 
   "rulePermission":"DENY" 
} 
 
Figure 4.13: Policy 
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Based on policy 57890, the C-ABAC model performs the following evaluation: 
 
function request { 
  if (requestorSubject == 937930 and targetSubject == 678900 and targetResource.equals ("Fitbit") 
{ 
    return "resource.denied"; 
  } else { 
    return "resource.denied"; 
  } 
} 
Figure 4.14: Policy Evaluation 
 
4.1.3.3. Rule Evaluation 
 
The following table outlines rules that belong to policy, P1. 
Rule Resource (r) Patient (u) Performer (p) Order Action Exception Condition 
r1 Fitbit 678900 937930 1 read None True 
r2 Fitbit 678900 937930 1 read None False 
 
Dr. Smith issues a request, q1, to access Sarah’s Fitbit data. The request issues Permit and Deny 
at the same time.  Using the Deny-overrides (Ordered and Unordered), the access request will be 
denied. This is in case r1 is not removed when Sarah’s revokes her consent directive. 
Rules (P1, q1) = {r1, r2} 





As can be seen in use Case 3, the C-ABAC model meets the “consumer-friendly-mechanism” 
requirement, as users such as Sarah are able to grant and withdraw consent in real time through 
the Ontario HIE application. 
4.1.4. Use Case 4 – Consent Codifiability 
4.1.4.1. Purpose and Workflow 
 
The purpose of this use case is to empower patients to share all data, some data or a specific 
category of data. This use case also allows HIE participants to enforce patients’ privacy wishes 
through standard codable concepts using security labels.  A security label is a concept attached to 
a resource to provide specific security metadata about that resource [135]. The Fast Healthcare 
Interoperability Resources (FHIR) specifications define a set of core security labels for all 
compliant systems.  Table 1 lists the three categories defined by the FHIR specifications for 







Context of use 
Purpose of Use “Purpose of use” indicates the reason for performing a specific operation on data 
objects. Examples of purposes of use for health records include diagnostics, public 
health and research.  
Data Sensitivity 
Confidentiality Codes Confidentiality can be applied to any data object or an attribute by the data object 
owner. The FHIR specifications define six data sensitivity/confidentiality codes: 
unrestricted (U ), low (L), moderate (M), normal (N), restricted (R) and very 
restricted (V). 
 
Control of Flow 
Delete After Use: DELAU An application receiving a data object with this label must delete all copies after 
the immediate use. 
Do Not Reuse: NOREUSE An application receiving a data object with this label may use it only for the 
immediate purpose. The receiving application is not authorized to redistribute it. 
 
Test Data: HTEST This label indicates that the data object has been created to test an application and 
it is not real production data. 
 
Table 4.2: FHIR Security Labels [135] 
 
Codifiability is the ability to structure the information into a set of standard codable 
concepts. To enable codifiability, the C-ABAC model uses security labels together with subject 
attributes, environmental conditions and resource attributes to approve or deny access requests and 
determine what resources can be returned.  In this use case, patient Larry has a history of mental 
illness. Larry allows his psychologist to access all his medical records. However, other physicians 
can access his records except for his mental illness medical history. The Ontario HIE application 
holds the following data objects in Figure 4.15 associated with patient Larry. 
 
Figure 4.15: Patient Larry Resources and Care Team 
The Ontario HIE application stores eight distinct resources on behalf of patient Larry: (1) 
patient demographics, (2) nutrition, (3) sleep, (4) weight, (5) diabetes, (6) biometrics, (7) 
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behavioral health and (8) fitness.  Resources (1) through (6) are labeled restricted, resource (7) is 
labeled very restricted and resource (8) is labeled moderately restricted. Figure 4.16 outlines the 




Figure 4.16: Patient Larry Confidentiality Classifications 
 
Table 4.3 describes the FHIR confidentiality classifications that can be used to tag 
resources and enable confidentiality classification [136]. 
 
Code Display Definition 
U Unrestricted Privacy metadata indicating that the information is not classified as sensitive. Applies 
to data elements such as name, phone and address that are widely available in the public 
domain. 
L Low Privacy metadata indicating that the information has been de-identified, and there are 
mitigating circumstances that prevent re-identification, which minimizes risk of harm 
from unauthorized disclosure. 
M Moderate Privacy metadata indicating moderately sensitive information that presents moderate 
risk of harm, such as data on running activity shared through social media. 
N Normal Privacy metadata indicating that the information is typical, non-stigmatizing health 
information that presents a typical risk of harm if disclosed without authorization. 
R Restricted Privacy metadata indicating highly sensitive, potentially stigmatizing information that 
presents a high risk to the subject if disclosed without authorization. 
V Very Restricted Privacy metadata indicating that the information is extremely sensitive and likely 
stigmatizing health information that presents a very high risk if disclosed without 
authorization. This information must be kept in the highest confidence. 
Table 4.3: Confidentiality Classifications 
4.1.4.2. Mapping 
 
Using the C-ABAC resource service and consent service and the FHIR security labels, Larry is 
able to control access to his data objects based on the data confidentiality codes from Table 4.3.  




Patient Larry Demographics Psychologist  Behavioral Health Observation 
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{   
   "resourceType":"Patient", 
   "identifier":"567899991", 
   "name":"Larry", 













{   
   "resourceType":"Performer", 
   "identifier":"9123780", 
   "role":"CareTeam", 
    "function":"Psychologist", 
   "name":"Dr. Nancy ", 












{   
   "resourceType":"Observation", 
   "identifier":"187776", 
   "patient":"567899991", 
   "performer":"9123780", 
   "organization":"64537237 ", 
   "securityLable":"V", 
   "type":"Behavioral Assessment Composite Measure", 
   "description":"Screening for Alcohol Misuse and  
                              Screening for Depression", 
   "speech":"Pressured", 
   "intellect":"Average", 
   "judgment":"Impaired", 
   "impulseControl":"Impaired", 
   "memory":"Remote", 
   "concentration":"Impaired", 
   "attention":"Impaired", 
   "Behavior":"Inappropriate" 
} 
Figure 4.17: Patient, Psychologist and Behavioral Health Resources 
 
The behavioral health resource is labeled with a security label of Very Restricted (V). In 
this use case, Dr. Nancy is Larry’s psychologist, and Dr. Smith is Larry’s primary care physician.  
Dr. Smith is allowed to view all Larry’s medical records except the resources with the label of V. 
Figure 4.18 shows Dr. Smith’s resource. 
 
{   
   "resourceType":"Performer", 
   "identifier":"937930", 
   "role":"CareTeam", 
    "function":"PrimaryCarePhysician", 
   "name":"Dr. Smith", 
   "Organization":"64537237 " 
} 
Figure 4.18: Performer Resource 
 
Using the C-ABAC consent service, Larry is able to upload a consent directive to 
authorize Dr. Nancy to access all his medical records, including the medical records that are 
labeled Very Restricted (V). Larry is able to create a second consent directive to authorize Dr. 
Smith access to all his medical records except the medical records with the label Very Restricted 
(V).  Figure 4.19 displays Larry’s consent directives. 
 
Without Exception With Exception 
{   
   "resourceType":"Consent", 
   "identifier":"3499998", 
   "patient":"567899991", 
   "performer":"9123780", 
   "organization":"64537237”, 
   "status":"active", 
   "scope":"Privacy", 
   "dateTime":"2019-06-05T15:04:51.559Z", 
{   
   "resourceType":"Consent", 
   "identifier":"3499998", 
   "patient":"567899991", 
   "performer":937930", 
   "organization":"64537237”, 
   "status":"active", 
   "scope":"Privacy", 
   "dateTime":"2019-06-05T15:04:51.559Z", 
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   "policyRule":"AccessAllResources rule", 
   } 
 
   "policyRule":"AccessAllResources rule", 
   "exception":{   
      "dataType":"Resource", 
      "securityLabel":"V", 
      "action":"unauthorized", 
      "period":"all" 
   } 
} 
 
Figure 4.19: Larry’s Consent Directives 
4.1.4.3. Applicability 
 
Codifiability is the ability to structure the information into a set of standard codable concepts.  
Unlike existing consent management solutions and existing literature that focuses mainly on 
enforcing consent and using proprietary permissions and codes that are open to interpretation, the 
C-ABAC model uses a healthcare industry standard to enable classification of data through the use 
of security labels. All FHIR compliant systems use the same definitions of these security labels.  
Using the C-ABAC model, Larry can label his resources based on the sensitivity of the data and, 
through the use of the “Very Restricted” label, can share his behavioral health data with his 
psychologist but not with other care team members.  This use case meets many of the C-ABAC 
key characteristic requirements:  
 
• Choice: Larry is able to create two consent directives to control access to his medical 
records. 
• Consumer-friendly mechanism: Larry is able to use one centralized consent directive 
system to manage access to his data objects instead of using paper-based consent directives 
and decentralized consent systems.   
• Interoperable: Since the C-ABAC resources follows the FHIR specifications, the model is 
interoperable with other systems that are FHIR compliant. 
• Codifiable: Through the use of the FHIR security labels, Larry is able to tag his resources 
with standard codes such as Very Restricted (V), Moderate (M), and Low (L). 
4.1.5. Use Case 5 – Consent Interoperability 
4.1.5.1.  Purpose and Workflow 
 
In this use case, we address a US-led interoperability initiative called MyHealthEData [137].  The 
MyHealthEData initiative enables patients to access their data and share it with whomever they 
want, making the patient the center of the healthcare system. In this use case, Bob is a patient of 
two healthcare organizations: Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH) and The Dana Farber 
Cancer Institute (DFCI).  Both organizations hold Bob's medical records in their systems in an 
FHIR format. 
 
Per the requirements of the MyHealthEData initiative, Bob wants to access and his medical 
records and control how they are shared with his care team members from both organizations 
without paperwork and without delays. Time is of the essence, as Bob is dealing with stage 3 lung 
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cancer due to smoking.  Figure 4.20 depicts the resources that Bob wants to share between MGH 
and DFCI. 
 
Figure 4.20: Resource Sharing 
 
The MassHIway is a statewide electronic HIE launched by Massachusetts.  Both MGH and 
DFCI are members of the MassHIway. Since both organizations are members of the same HIE, 
Bob is able to create one consent directive to share resources between the two organizations.  Once 
Bob is logged into the MassHIway portal, he is able to follow a two-step process to create one 
consent directive and apply it to resources (depicted in Figure 4.21). 
 
Figure 4.21: Consent Workflow 
4.1.5.2. Mapping 
 
The following JSON is Bob’s consent directive: 
 
{   
   "resourceType":"Consent", 
   "identifier":"839393030", 
   "patient":"30393030", 
   "performer":"", 
   "status":"active", 
   "scope":"Privacy", 
   "dateTime":"2019-0603T15:04:51.559Z", 
   "PolicyRule":[   
      {   
         "organization":"930303030 //DFCI organization identifier", 
         "resource":"DFCI.ImagingStudy, DFCI.DiagnosticReport, DFCI.Medication", 
         "purpose":"ShareWith", 
 67 
         "organizationTarget":"9303030887" 
      }, 
      {   
         "organization":"9303030887", 
         "resource":"MGH.Specimen, MGH.Observation, MGH.Medication", 
         "purpose":"ShareWith", 
         "organizationTarget":"30303030 //DFCI organization identifier" 
      } 





Unlike existing access control solutions that use custom data contracts and interfaces, the C-ABAC 
model uses a well-defined industry standard – the FHIR specifications [48].  The C-ABAC model 
meets the interoperability requirement, as all systems that are FHIR compliant are able to parse 
and consume the C-ABAC FHIR-based resources. 
4.1.6. Use Case 6 – Consent Deployment and Separation of Concerns 
 
As outlined in Chapter 3, the C-ABAC model is divided into two components: (1) a consent 
expression component and (2) a consent enforcement component. Each component is divided into 
three self-contained services and each service can be deployed on its own.  The consent expression 
component includes: (1) a subject service, (2) a consent directive service and, (3) a resource 
service.  The consent enforcement service includes: (1) an authentication service, (2) an 
authorization service, and (3) a policy management service. 
 
We followed a microservice architecture style to meet the separation of concerns 
requirements.  We created a set of microservices in which each microservice has its own data store 
and its own representational state transfer (REST)ful API endpoint.  The following are the C-
ABAC endpoints to express and enforce consent: 
 
• Authentication Service: https://<host>/authentication 
• Authorization Service: https://<host>/authorization 
• Policy Management Service: https://<host>/policy 
• Subject Service: https://<host>/subject 
• Consent Directive Service: https://<host>/consent 
• Resource Service: https://<host>/resource 
4.1.7. Summary 
 
In this section, we provided six uses cases for how the C-ABAC model can be applied in real-
world scenarios. The use cases meet the C-ABAC optimistic requirements described in Chapter 1.  
In the next section, we validate the C-ABAC model by testing its features against a publicly 




To validate the C-ABAC model, we created a prototype and tested the C-ABAC features against 
a publicly available healthcare data set from the UHN with the following use cases: 
 
• Label medical records at the resource level 
• Label medical records at the attribute level 
• Create consent directive 
• Read consent directive 
• Update consent directive 
• Delete consent directive 
• Access resource 
 
Within this section, we describe testing steps and detail results from four of these test cases, 







Table 4.4: Test Cases 
4.2.1. Data Set 
 
To test the validity of the C-ABAC model, we created a C-ABAC prototype, deployed it to the 
cloud, and used it on a set of test cases.  These C-ABAC test cases were validated against a publicly 
available data set from the UHN HAPI-FHIR server (https://fhirtest.uhn.ca/), which was used as a 
healthcare resource server.  As of May 2019, the UHN HAPI server had available the data set 
detailed in Table 4.5. 
 
Resource Name Number  Resource Name Number 
Patient 1,134,846 AllergyIntolerance 3,437 
Observation 308,481 Organization 3,197 
MedicationAdministration 56,314 CarePlan 2,409 
MedicationStatement 40,391 Provenance 2,389 
Encounter 30,462 StructureDefinition 1,358 
MedicationRequest 18,557 ProcedureRequest 716 
Claim 15,803 PractitionerRole 452 
Procedure 11,610 RelatedPerson 204 
ValueSet 11,473 Person 172 
Binary 10,058 ImagingStudy 120 
Practitioner 9,742 Subscription 116 
ExplanationOfBenefit 8,918 CareTeam 104 
Immunization 7,989 Schedule 63 
Test Case # Use Case Name 
1 Register and label medical records at the resource level 
2 Create and store consent directive(s) 
3 Enforce consent directive(s) 
4 Access resource(s) 
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Medication 6,720 Specimen 32 
DiagnosticReport 4,740 ResearchStudy 7 
 
Table 4.5: University Health Network (UHN) Test Data 
 
We used the template in Table 4.6 to document the requirements of each test case scenario. 
 
Test Case ID A unique identifier for the test case (e.g. 1) 
Use Case Name A short name for the test case using a verb (e.g. Create Consent) 
Actors An actor or a system component that interacts with the system to accomplish 
specific tasks 
Description A brief description of the test case and outcome expected 
Preconditions A list of activities that must take place, or any conditions that must be true, 
before the test case can be started 
Postcondition A description of the state of the system at the conclusion of the test case 
execution 
Normal Flow A detailed description of the user actions and system responses that would 
take place during execution of the test case under normal, expected conditions 
 
Table 4.6: Test Case Template 
 
4.2.2. Testing Tool 
 
We used the Postman API testing environment to manually validate the C-ABAC test cases. 
Postman is a tool for developing, testing, sharing and documenting APIs.  It is available for use 
and download from https://www.getpostman.com/. There are two main versions of the Postman 
tool: (1) a downloadable version for MacOS, Windows or Linux and (2) a Chrome browser 
extension version. We used the MacOS version. Its main screen is shown in Figure 4.22. 
 
Figure 4.22: Postman API Testing Environment User Interface 
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4.2.3. Test Case 1 – Label Medical Records at the Resource Level 
4.2.3.1. Purpose and Workflow 
 
In this test case, UHN test patient 6, John, had 1 patient resource, 10 encounter resources, 30 
observation resources, 3 medication resources and 4 imaging study resources.  Test case 1 is 
detailed in Table 4.7. 
 
Test Case ID 1 
Use Case Name Label Medical Records at the Resource Level 
Actors Patient 6 
Description Patient labels several medical resources 
Preconditions 1. Patient is successfully logged in to the HIE portal. 
2. Patient is authorized to manage medical resources for the purpose of sharing. 
Postconditions 1. Verify that patient is able to manage and label medical resources with 
security labels. 
2. Verify that the data is stored in the C-ABAC resource data store. 
Normal Flow 1. Through an existing HIE patient portal UI, the patient selects several 
medical resources. 
2. The patient tags highly sensitive records with the Very Restricted (V) 
security label and tags other resources with the Moderate (M) security label. 
3. The patient clicks the “label” button. 
4. The HIE patient portal UI makes a call to the C-ABAC register API 
endPoint to label the medical resources as per the patient’s instructions. 
5. The patient gets an HTTP response code of 201, which indicates that the 
resources are stored with the appropriate security labels. 
 
Table 4.7: Register and Label Resources Test Case 1 
 
Patient 6 registered several medical resources and labeled them with confidentiality codes of 






Figure 4.23: Label Resources Test Case 1 Workflow  
4.2.3.2. Testing Steps 
 
The following steps enable patient 6 to label medical resources with security labels: 
1. Through the HIE portal, patient 6 selects 1 patient resource, 10 encounter resources, 30 
observation resources, 3 medication resources and 4 imaging study resources. 
2. Patient 6 labels each resource with a security label of either Very Restricted (V) or 
Moderate (M). 
3. Patient 6 clicks on the label button.  




Once patient 6 clicked the label button, the HIE portal made a call to the C-ABAC resource API 
endPoint, https://cabac.com/resource. We used the Postman API environment to simulate the label 
button action.  Through the Postman API testing environment, we sent the JSON payload in Figure 
4.24 to label resources. 
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Figure 4.24: C-ABAC Resource Registration and Labeling Using the Postman API 
Testing Environment 
 
Figure 4.24 shows patient 6 labeling two resources. The patient resource is labeled 
Moderate (M) and the encounter resource is labeled Very Restricted (V).  Patient 6 labeled the 
remaining resources using the same process.  Once patient 6 clicked the label button, the expected 
HTTP code of 201 was returned, indicating that the resource was created successfully. 
 
If the https://cabac.com/resource API endPoint returns an HTTP response code of 201, the 
expected result is that the resources were labeled and stored in the C-ABAC resource Cassandra 
data model.  To verify that the resources were labeled and stored in the C-ABAC Cassandra data 
model, we ran the select statement “select * from resource;” as shown in Figure 4.25. 
 
 
Figure 4.25: Patient 6 Resources 
 
 
The “label medical records at the resource level” test case 1 was tested successfully, since the 
expected outcome was the storage and labeling of patient 6 medical resources in the C-ABAC 
Cassandra data store.  The next test case is for patient 6 to create a consent directive to control 
access to his medical resources. 
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4.2.4. Test Case 2 – Create and Store Consent Directive(s) 
4.2.4.1. Purpose and Workflow 
 
In test case 2, patient 6, John, created a consent directive to control access to his 48 medical 
resources. Patient 6 allowed his care team to access all the moderately restricted (M) resources, 
while his psychologist was allowed to access both the moderately restricted (M) and the very 
restricted resources (V). A description of test case 2 workflow is given in Table 4.8. 
 
Use Case ID 1 
Use Case Name Create Consent Directive(s) 
Actors Patient 6 
Description Patient creates a new consent using the HIE portal. 
Preconditions 1. Patient is successfully logged into the HIE portal. 
2. Patient is authorized to create consent directives. 
3. Patient has already labeled resources to be shared. 
Postconditions 1. Patient is able to create a consent directive. 
2. Patient gets a confirmation in the form of HTTP code 201 indicating that 
the consent directive is stored successfully. 
Normal Flow 1. Through an existing HIE patient portal UI, patient creates a consent 
directive to grant performer 16, psychologist, access to all his medical 
records.  The rest of the care team are authorized to access only 
moderately restricted resources (M). 
2. The patient clicks the “create” button. 
3. The HIE patient portal UI makes a call to the C-ABAC consent API 
endPoint to store the patient consent directive. 
4. The patient gets an HTTP response code of 201, which indicates that the 
consent is stored in the C-ABAC data model. 
 
Table 4.8: Create Consent Directive Test Case 
 




Figure 4.26: Create Consent 
4.2.4.2. Testing Steps 
 
The following steps enable patient 6 to create a consent directive to control access to his medical 
resources: 
1. Through the HIE portal, patient 6 opens the tab to create a consent directive to control 
access to his medical resource. 
2. Patient 6 assigns the label moderately restricted (M) to his care team identifier with role 
20. 
3. Even though performer 16, psychologist, is also a member of the care team with role 20, 
patient 6 allows perform 16 to access both moderately restricted (M) and very restricted 
(V) medical resources. 
4. Once patient 6 clicks the create button, the HIE portal makes a call to the C-ABAC consent 
API to create a consent directive. 





Once patient 6 clicked the create button, The HIE portal made a call to the C-ABAC consent API 
endPoint, https://cabac.com/consent, to create a consent directive with the JSON payload outlined 




Figure 4.27: Consent Directive 
 
Figure 4.28 shows patient 6 creating and submitting a consent directive that allows 
performer 16, phycologist, to access all his medical records while allowing the rest of his care 
team, with role 20, to access only moderately restricted (M) medical resources.  Once patient 6 
clicked the register button, the expected result of an HTTP code of 201 was returned. 
 
If the https://cabac.com/consent API endPoint returns an HTTP response code of 201, the 
expected result is that the consent directive has been stored in the C-ABAC resource Cassandra 
data model.  We ran the select statement “select * from consent;” to verify that the consent 
directive(s) were stored in the C-ABAC consent data model (Figure 4.8). 
 
 




The “create and store consent directive for test case 1” test case 2 was successful since the 
expected outcome was the creation and storage of the consent directive in the C-ABAC Cassandra 
data store.  The next test case is to convert patient 6’s consent directives into a set of policies to be 
enforced by the PEP of the ABAC model. 
 
4.2.5. Test Case 3 – Enforce Consent Directive(s)  
 
In test case 3, the C-ABAC policy management service automatically converts patient 6’s consent 
directives into a set of policies. The set of policies are used by the PEP to render a decision on 
whether to grant or deny access to the requested resources. Table 4.9 contains a description of test 
case 1 workflow. 
 
Use Case ID 1 
Use Case Name Convert Consent Directives into Policies 
Actors C-ABAC policy management service 
Description Convert consent directives into set policies. 
Preconditions 1. Patient labels resources to be shared. 
2. Patient creates one or many consent directives. 
Postconditions 1. C-ABAC policy management service automatically converts one or 
many consent directives into a set of policies. 
2. Patient gets a confirmation in the form of HTTP code 201, indicating 
that consent directives have been converted into access policies. 
Normal Flow 1. Once patient 6 clicks on the “create” consent directive, and the consent 
directive is stored in the C-ABAC data model, the C-ABAC policy 
management service converts the consent directives into a set of access 
policies. 
2. The patient gets a confirmation in the form of HTTP code 201, 
indicating that consent directives have been converted into access 
policies. 
 
Table 4.9: Convert Consent Directives into Policies 
 
Figure 4.29 diagrams the test case 3 workflow. 
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Figure 4.29: Convert Consent Directives into Policies 
 
4.2.5.1. Testing Steps 
 
The following steps enable the C-ABAC policy management service to convert consent directives 
into set policies.  
1. Through the HIE portal, patient 6 opens the tab to create a consent directive to control 
access to his medical resource. 
2. Patient 6 assigns the label Moderate (M) to his care team identifier with role 20. 
3. Even though performer 16, psychologist, is also a member of the care team with role 20, 
patient 6 allows performer 16 to access both moderately restricted (M) and very restricted 
(V) medical resources. 
4. Once patient 6 clicks the create button, the HIE portal makes a call to the C-ABAC consent 
API to create a consent directive. 
5. The C-ABAC consent API stores patient 6’s consent directive in the C-ABAC consent data 
model. 
6. The consent data store confirms that the consent directive is successfully stored. 
7. The C-ABAC consent service makes a call to the C-ABAC policy management service to 
automatically convert the consent directive(s) into a set of policies. The consent service 
passes the consent directive JSON payload from Figure 4.28 in the request body to the 
policy management service. 
8. The policy data store confirms that the policy is successfully stored. 
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9. The policy management service responds with an HTTP code of 201, indicating that the 
policy has been successfully created. 
10. The consent service responds with an HTTP code of 201, indicating that the consent and 




Once the consent directive is stored successfully, and the C-ABAC consent service issues a 
request to the policy service to create a policy set, the expected result is the automated creation 
of an Abbreviated Language for Authorization (ALFA) policy set. Figure 4.30 is the policySet 
that the C-ABAC model was able to generate for patient 6’s consent directive. 
 
 
Figure 4.30: ALFA PolicySet 
  
4.2.6. Test Case 4 – Access Resource(s)  
4.2.6.1. Purpose and Workflow 
 
In test case 4 (Table 4.10), several performers are trying to access patient’s 6 medical resources.  
A performer can be a physician, nurse, role, department or organization.  In this test case, the 
following three performers want to access patient 6’s medical resources: 
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• Performer 16, psychologist: This performer is a practitioner, a member of the care team, 
with practitioner role of 20. 
• Role 20, care team:  The care team has a practitioner role of 20. 
• Performer 490, a researcher. 
 
Use Case ID 1 
Use Case Name Access Resource(s) 
Actors Performers: Practitioner 16, PractitionerRole 20 and Researcher 490 
Description Performer issues a request to access a patient’s medical resources. 
Preconditions 1. Performer is successfully logged in to the HIE portal. 
2. Performer is authorized to issue requests to access medical resources. 
Postconditions Performer gets either an HTTP code of 200 OK, indicating that the request 
is granted and the resource(s) are retrieved, or an HTTP code of 403 
Forbidden, indicating that the C-ABAC server understood the request but is 
refusing to fulfill it. 
Normal Flow 1. Through an existing HIE patient portal UI, performer issues a request to 
access one or many medical resource(s). 
2. The performer clicks the “access” button. 
3. The HIE portal UI makes a call to the C-ABAC authorization service to 
evaluate the performer’s access request by evaluating it through the 
PEP. 
4. The C-ABAC server responds with either an HTTP code of 200 OK, 
indicating that the request is granted and the resources are retrieved, or 
an HTTP code of 403 Forbidden, indicating that the C-ABAC server 
understood the request but is refusing to fulfill it. HTTP 403 indicates 
that the access requested is denied. 
 
Table 4.10: Access Resource(s) Test Case 
 





Figure 4.31: Performer 16 Access Request 
 
 









Performer 16 was granted access to resources with a security label of Very Restricted (V) and 
Moderate (M). Performer 16 was also able to access patient 6’s demographics resource and 
observation 14 resource.  Practitioner Role 20, with a security label of Moderate (M), was able to 
access only the patient demographics but was denied access to observation 14.  Performer 490 
was denied access to all patient 6’s medical records and thus the C-ABAC model performed as 






We tested the performance of the test cases, as summarized here. 
• Number of users before test: 1 million patients, 50,000 observations and 2,000 performers. 
• Duration: 24 hours 
• Start time: October 1, 2016 at 9:00 am EST 
• Concurrent Users: 100 users 
• Instance: 2GB memory 
Endurance Test – 24 Hours – 1 instance with 2GB 
# API # Requests (Count) Avg (Secs) (90%) (Secs) Min (Secs) Max (Secs) Error % TPS 
1 Register User 63,221 0.154 0.183 0.077 3.110 0.002% 0.7 
2 Login Registered User 63,220 0.081 0.097 0.058 5.003 0.009% 0.7 
3 Manage a Resource 63,208 0.042 0.048 0.024 1.236 0.000% 0.7 
4 Create Consent 63,208 0.057 0.062 0.039 2.351 0.000% 0.7 
5 Update Consent 63,214 0.154 0.175 0.069 5.015 0.005% 0.7 
6 Read Consent 63,209 0.078 0.087 0.044 3.058 0.000% 0.7 
7 Delete Consent 63,208 0.029 0.037 0.019 2.726 0.000% 0.7 
8 Access Resource 63,208 0.086 0.093 0.074 1.777 0.000% 0.7 
 
The standard expectation for a login and access request is 3 seconds or less, and the C-
ABAC model was able to achieve this goal 90 percent of the time. 
 
The User Managed Access framework is able to achieve similar performance metrics to 
the C-ABAC model. SGAC and ReBAC consent models are not available for deployment and 
there are no published performance metrics from the creators of these consent models. 
4.2.8. Other Requirements 
 
In this section, we cover the following additional requirements that the C-ABAC model 
addresses: 
• Consistency 
• Correctness and Completeness 
4.2.8.1. Consistency, Regulatory, and Organization of Rules 
 
The C-ABAC consent directive is converted into a set of policies.  Each policy can contain 
multiple rules.  Rules are ordered in sequential order from 1 to x umber of rules.  Rules are 
evaluated in sequential order from important to less important.  For example, regulatory rules are 
more important than organization rules. Organization rules are more important than the patient’s 
privacy rules.  The XACML combining first applicable algorithm [138]  combines decision in 
such a way that the final decision returned is the first one produced either of Permit or Deny 
regardless of the patient privacy wishes. 
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Also, some of the rules within the same policy and same order can conflict with each 
other and return different decision such as permit and Deny at the same time. 
 
Here is an example of policy that produces Permit and Deny at the same time. 
 
• Policy: role = = Data Scientist AND action = = view AND resourceType = = 
ImagingStudy 
o Rule 1: deny if purposeOfUse != treatment 
o Rue 2: permit 
 
The above policy means “a data scientist cannot view the ImagingStudy resource, but at 
the same time, he or she is permitted to view the ImagingStudy. To resolve the problem with 
conflicting policy, the C-ABAC model uses the XACML combining algorithm [138].  A 
combining algorithm determines which rules are to be evaluated, and how various combination 
of results are to be resolved. Some examples of standard combining algorithms are:  
 
• Deny-overrides (Ordered and Unordered). 




In our example, we implement “Deny-overrides” by default and thus the data scientist 
will be denied access to the imaging study resource.   This This combining algorithm combines 
decisions in such a way that if any decision is a Deny, then that decision wins.  
 
4.2.8.2. Correctness and Completeness 
 
To achieve correctness, patient privacy consent directives are validated against a well-defined C-
ABAC consent data contract (section 3.4.4).  Once validated, the consent directives are then 
converted into a set of privacy rules that are enforced by the C-ABAC enforcement component.    
 
Every access request is represented by a tuple (u, p, r, s, a, e, b), section 3.1.4 and thus all 
requests must be evaluated against the set of all possible requests from a policy.  Evaluation is 
done through the Policy Enforcement Point, Figure 3.19.  Access requests will be automatically 
denied if there are not matching rules to evaluate. 
 
4.3. Summary – Analysis of C-ABAC Against the Design 
Requirements 
 
As part of Chapter 1 and based on the current literature, we compiled a list of key characteristic 
requirements that a well-designed privacy preservation framework should meet.  The compiled list 
has 10 requirements that the C-ABAC model should meet to be considered well designed. The 
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Table 4.10: C-ABAC Model Grading 
 
Choice: This refers to the ability for patients to give informed consent as opposed to 
implied consent.  In informed consent, a patient signs, physically or electronically, a medical 
consent directive. The C-ABAC model makes it easier for patients to give informed consent as 
opposed to implied consent by allowing them to access all their consent directives from one 
centralized consent directive data store. Thus, the C-ABAC model rates strong in meeting the 
choice optimistic requirement. 
 
Consumer-friendly mechanism: Instead of dealing with different organizations to 
manage consent, patients can manage all their privacy settings in one centralized consent directive 
solution.  Even though the C-ABAC makes it easier for users to manage all their consent in one 
centralized interface, we graded the C-ABAC between 0 (neutral) and +1 (strong) because the user 
interface is out of the scope of our research.  If the user interface had been within the scope of our 
research, the C-ABAC could have been graded +1 (strong). 
 
Interoperable: A privacy model should be interoperable, so it can easily be integrated with 
existing healthcare systems.  We use a widely used FHIR health care data standard to create our 
interfaces and the C-ABAC data contracts.  FHIR allows the C-ABAC interfaces and data contracts 
to be consumed and processed by FHIR-compliant systems. The C-ABAC model is graded +1 
(strong) in meeting the interoperability optimistic requirement. 
 
Automation: Consent should be machine-readable and machine-actionable, requiring no 
human intervention and allowing systems to operationalize, access, use and disclose controls.  One 
of the key values added is the automated conversion of expressed consent directives into ALFA. 
ALFA rules are retrieved and analyzed by the PEP C-ABAC component to determine whether to 
















Separation of concern +1 
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Granular: The system should allow users to go to go from general (overall opt-in/opt-out) 
to granular (specific data attribute, specific people, specific consuming applications). The C-
ABAC model allows users to control access to their medical records at a fine-grained level by 
assigning security labels at the attributes level to any resource, including medical records and data 
access requestors.  The C-ABAC model is graded +1 (strong) on meeting the granularity optimistic 
requirement. 
 
Codifiable: The C-ABAC model meets the codifiability optimistic requirements and is 
graded +1 because it uses FHIR security labels that allow users to add security metadata at the 
resource and attribute levels. 
 
Flexible/Adaptable: A privacy preservation model should allow features to be “turned-
on” or “turned-off” based on differing levels of jurisdictional requirements. Figure 1.10 depicts 
the different attributes that can be used by the C-ABAC PEP to render a decision on whether the 
access request is granted or denied.  The attributes include regulatory attributes related to the 
jurisdiction. For this reason, the C-ABAC model is graded +1 (strong) on this requirement. 
 
Unambiguous/Complete: Through the use cases outlined in Chapter 4, a patient can 
upload one or many consent directives. When there is a conflict between the directives, the most 
restrictive consent directive takes priority as part of the PDP.  For this reason, the C-ABAC model 
is graded +1 (strong) on this requirement. 
 
Dynamic: The C-ABAC model meets the dynamic optimistic requirement with a grade of 
+1 (strong). The model allows authorization and access rights to medical records to be granted 
dynamically in real-time using attribute-based rules and policies such as user attributes, resource 
attributes, time, geography and security labels.  
 
Separation of concerns: The C-ABAC is graded +1 (strong) on this requirement because 
it uses a microservice architecture.  The C-ABAC model is divided to six services, each self-









5. Summary and Future Work 
5.1. Summary 
 
The work undertaken in this thesis makes a signification contribution in the domain of privacy and 
security.  The novel contribution with the C-ABAC model is that the patient can create privacy 
settings at any abstraction level, from the record level to the single attribute level to achieve fined-
grained access control.  Compared to existing privacy models that do not follow any data modeling 
standards, the C-ABAC model is interoperable and can easily be integrated with existing electronic 
systems that are FHIR compliant through the use of RESTful APIs and the FHIR data standard. 
The C-ABAC model not only empowers patients to control who has access to their medical 
records, but also empowers organizations to enforce consent directives in an automated manner 
converting consent directives into access policies with manual intervention. 
 
To give patients control over their medical records, we came up with a new architecture of 
a new standard for authorization that is consent-centric, patient-centric, fine grained, industry 
specific (healthcare) and based on contemporary data standards (FHIR).  
 
The C-ABAC model addresses two important issues that are at the forefront of ensuring 
that patients are able to express discrete levels of consent and know that their privacy wishes are 
fully respected by healthcare IT systems: (1) C-ABAC allows patients to express informed consent 
at any abstraction level – from the record level to the data field level – and (2) C-ABAC guarantees 
that patient consent directives are enforced at the system level, ensuring that detailed and discrete 
patient consent directives are available to all parties needing access to this information.   
 
The ideal candidates for C-ABAC are HIEs that allow member health organizations to 
exchange patient medical records with each other and with external stakeholders such as research 
organizations, public health officials and insurance companies. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: C-ABAC Components 
 
To come up with a new standard for authorization, we assembled a set of optimistic 
requirements that a good privacy model should meet.  These key characteristic requirements have 
been defined by Maler [34], Xiang et al. [46] and Moehrke et al. [36].  We graded the C-ABAC 
model against this set of optimistic requirements using grades of +1 (strong), 0 (neutral) and -1 
(weak). Results are given in Table 5.1. This table also shows our comparison of the proposed 
model to existing consent model types; the result is that the C-ABAC model exceeds existing 
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consent model types in empowering patients to express consent and enabling health organization 





Requirements Existing Consent Mechanisms New 
Model 
TaC opt-in Cookie opt-
in/out 
OAuth Share Consent 
directive 
UMA C-ABAC 
Choice -1 0 0 +1 +1 0/+1 +1 
Consumer-friendly 
mechanism (Relevance) 
-1 0 +1 +1 0 +1 0/+1 
Interoperable  -1 0 0/+1 +1 0 0/+1 +1 
Automation -1 0 +1 +1 -1 0/+1 +1 
Granular -1 0 0/+1 -1 0 +1 +1 
Codifiable -1 0 +1 +1 -1 -1 +1 
Flexible/acceptable -1 -1 -1 0 -1 +1 +1 
Unambiguous/complete -1 -1 0 +1 0 +1 +1 
Dynamic -1 -1 0 0 0 0 +1 
Separation of concerns -1 -1 +1 0 0 +1 +1 
 
Table 5.1: C-ABAC Model Versus Existing Consent Model Types 
 
The C-ABAC model follows a microservice architecture in which services are designed to 
be used independently so services can be scaled up to handle large numbers of patients wanting to 
manage consent. All services are exposed through RESTful APIs, and all request and response 
resources use a JavaScript object notation (JSON) format. The C-ABAC model is composed of 
two distinct components managing (1) consent expression and (2) consent enforcement. The 
consent expression component is divided into three services: (1) a subject service, (2) a resource 
service and (3) a consent directive service. The consent enforcement component is divided into 
three services: (1) an authentication service, (2) an authorization service and (3) a policy 
management service.  
 
In summary, C-ABAC is (1) a new standard for “authorization,” (2) a new profile and 
application of the attribute-based access control (ABAC) framework, (3) healthcare centric, (4) a 
protocol to control access to APIs and healthcare resources, (5) patient-initiated, (6) fine-grained 
through the use of security metadata, (7) interoperable through the use of the FHIR standard, (8) 
centralized, (9) automated and (10) dynamic.   
 
If HIEs deploy the C-ABAC model and follow its principles, patients should have complete 




The following are potential limitations of the proposed C-ABAC model: 
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• Testing has been limited to one data set: C-ABAC has been verified and validated in 
only one large setting using test data from the Ontario University Health Network server 
[69]. It would be useful to test and validate the C-ABAC model with test data from other 
healthcare organizations. 
 
• Adoption of the C-ABAC model among healthcare organizations: Would healthcare 
organizations be willing to use a centralized consent-centric model as opposed to a 
decentralized consent-centric model? The assumption is that since healthcare organizations 
are willing to participate in HIEs and share data among themselves and with other 
stakeholders, they will be willing to adopt a centralized consent-centric model. A survey is 
needed to validate our assumption. 
 
• Patient interest: Would patients take the time to set privacy settings? Privacy is usually 
not a priority until a major data breach happen and is made public [139]. 
 
• User interface: In developing the C-ABAC model, we focused on the backend 
components, and C-ABAC services are exposed through RESTful APIs. The front end has 
been left to future work. 
 
• C-ABAC is not suitable for emergency situations: In an emergency situation, caregivers 
should be able to access the patient’s medical regardless of the patient’s privacy wishes. 
This can be achieved through the “break the glass” security labels than can be applied to 
patients, medical records and performers such as caregivers. 
 
• Auditing: Auditing is an important feature to verify and validate that patient privacy 
wishes are respected and enforced.  Auditing is left to a future study. 
5.3. Future Work 
 
The research in this thesis creates a set of services that empower patients to express fine-grained consent 
directives and enable healthcare organizations to enforce those directives. The following topics are 
potential future research initiatives that would complement our research: 
 
• Delegation: In an emergency situation, or when a patient is not legally capable to make a decision 
(e.g. children or the mentally ill), the C-ABAC model should be extended to enable delegation of 
responsibility to a guardian. 
• User interface: Patients need a user interface to manage their consent directives. 
• Auditing: An important aspect of access control, for both legal and security reasons, is the ability 
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